Related papers: Steering control of payoff-maximizing players in a…
Repeated game has long been the touchstone model for agents' long-run relationships. Previous results suggest that it is particularly difficult for a repeated game player to exert an autocratic control on the payoffs since they are jointly…
Since the introduction of zero-determinant strategies, extortionate strategies have received considerable interest. While an interesting class of strategies, the definitions of extortionate strategies are algebraically rigid, apply only to…
We discuss a model for evolutionary game dynamics in a growing, network-structured population. In our model, new players can either make connections to random preexisting players or preferentially attach to those that have been successful…
Gameplay under various forms of uncertainty has been widely studied. Feldman et al. (2010) studied a particularly low-information setting in which one observes the opponent's actions but no payoffs, not even one's own, and introduced an…
Punishment and partner switching are two well-studied mechanisms that support the evolution of cooperation. Observation of human behaviour suggests that the extent to which punishment is adopted depends on the usage of alternative…
Spatial evolutionary games provide a valuable framework for elucidating the emergence and maintenance of cooperative behavior. However, most previous studies assume that individuals are profiteers and neglect to consider the effects of…
Evolutionary games between species are known to lead to intriguing spatio-temporal patterns in systems of diffusing agent. However, the role of inter-species interactions is hardly studied when agents are (self-)propelled, as is the case in…
The emergence of complex networks from evolutionary games is studied occurring when agents are allowed to switch interaction partners. For this purpose a coevolutionary iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game is defined on a random network with…
Purpose: We propose a model to present a possible mechanism for obtaining sizeable behavioural structures by simulating an agent based on the evolutionary public good game with available social learning. Methods: The model considered a…
We construct a two species evolutionary game model of an online society consisting of ordinary users and behavior enforcers (moderators). Among themselves, moderators play a coordination game choosing between being "positive" or "negative"…
We study zero-sum differential games with state constraints and one-sided information, where the informed player (Player 1) has a categorical payoff type unknown to the uninformed player (Player 2). The goal of Player 1 is to minimize his…
This paper deals with modeling of network's dynamic using evolutionary games approach. Today there are many different protocols for data transmission through the Internet, providing users with better or worse service. The process of…
Controlling payoffs in repeated games is one of the important topics in control theory of multi-agent systems. Recently proposed zero-determinant strategies enable players to unilaterally enforce linear relations between payoffs.…
The theoretical description of the evolution of cooperation presented by Bergstrom based on assortative matching with partner choice allows to model the population dynamics in a game of Nonrepetitive Prisoners Dilemma. In this paper we…
Learning from a partner who collects higher payoff is a frequently used working hypothesis in evolutionary game theory. One of the alternative dynamical rules is when the focal player prefers to follow the strategy choice of the majority in…
Evolutionary Game Theory (EGT) and Artificial Intelligence (AI) are two fields that, at first glance, might seem distinct, but they have notable connections and intersections. The former focuses on the evolution of behaviors (or strategies)…
Many socio-economic and biological processes can be modeled as systems of interacting individuals. The behaviour of such systems can be often described within game-theoretic models. In these lecture notes, we introduce fundamental concepts…
Motivated by the fact that the same social dilemma can be perceived differently by different players, we here study evolutionary multigames in structured populations. While the core game is the weak prisoner's dilemma, a fraction of the…
While machine learning can myopically reinforce social inequalities, it may also be used to dynamically seek equitable outcomes. In this paper, we formalize long-term fairness in the context of online reinforcement learning. This…
The game interactions among individuals in nature are often uncertain and dynamically evolving, significantly influencing the persistence of cooperation. However, it remains a formidable challenge to effectively characterize these dynamic…