Related papers: Using Weighted Matching to Solve 2-Approval/Veto C…
Set-valued prediction is a well-known concept in multi-class classification. When a classifier is uncertain about the class label for a test instance, it can predict a set of classes instead of a single class. In this paper, we focus on…
Booking control problems are sequential decision-making problems that occur in the domain of revenue management. More precisely, freight booking control focuses on the problem of deciding to accept or reject bookings: given a limited…
It is well known, by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, that when there are more than two candidates, any non-dictatorial voting rule can be manipulated by untruthful voters. But how strong is the incentive to manipulate under different…
Ranked choice voting is vulnerable to monotonicity failure - a voting failure where a candidate is cost an election due to losing voter preference or granted an election due to gaining voter preference. Despite increasing use of ranked…
The integrity of elections is central to democratic systems. However, a myriad of malicious actors aspire to influence election outcomes for financial or political benefit. A common means to such ends is by manipulating perceptions of the…
We consider the problem of automating the verification of distributed control software relying on publish-subscribe middleware. In this scenario, the main challenge is that software correctness depends intrinsically on correct usage of…
Multi-winner voting is the process of selecting a fixed-size set of representative candidates based on voters' preferences. It occurs in applications ranging from politics (parliamentary elections) to the design of modern computer…
We examine an approval-based model of Liquid Democracy with a budget constraint on voting and delegating costs, aiming to centrally select casting voters ensuring complete representation of the electorate. From a computational complexity…
In the November 2016 U.S. presidential election, many state level public opinion polls, particularly in the Upper Midwest, incorrectly predicted the winning candidate. One leading explanation for this polling miss is that the precipitous…
For many voting rules, it is NP-hard to compute a successful manipulation. However, NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity. Recent theoretical results suggest that manipulation may often be easy in practice. We study empirically…
We consider the problem of finding a maximum popular matching in a many-to-many matching setting with two-sided preferences and matroid constraints. This problem was proposed by Kamiyama (2020) and solved in the special case where matroids…
We consider the problem of distributed multi-choice voting in a setting that each node can communicate with its neighbors merely by sending beep signals. Given its simplicity, the beep communication model is of practical importance in…
We investigate the problem of computing the probability of winning in an election where voter attendance is uncertain. More precisely, we study the setting where, in addition to a total ordering of the candidates, each voter is associated…
We develop robust pricing and hedging of a weighted variance swap when market prices for a finite number of co--maturing put options are given. We assume the given prices do not admit arbitrage and deduce no-arbitrage bounds on the weighted…
We investigate issues related to two hard problems related to voting, the optimal weighted lobbying problem and the winner problem for Dodgson elections. Regarding the former, Christian et al. [CFRS06] showed that optimal lobbying is…
In the metric distortion problem there is a set of candidates $C$ and voters $V$ in the same metric space. The goal is to select a candidate minimizing the social cost: the sum of distances of the selected candidate from all the voters, and…
An election is a pair $(C,V)$ of candidates and voters. Each vote is a ranking (permutation) of the candidates. An election is $d$-Euclidean if there is an embedding of both candidates and voters into $\mathbb{R}^d$ such that voter $v$…
The computational study of election problems generally focuses on questions related to the winner or set of winners of an election. But social preference functions such as Kemeny rule output a full ranking of the candidates (a consensus).…
Voting is a general method for preference aggregation in multiagent settings, but seminal results have shown that all (nondictatorial) voting protocols are manipulable. One could try to avoid manipulation by using voting protocols where…
We prove that the constructive weighted coalitional manipulation problem for the Schulze voting rule can be solved in polynomial time for an unbounded number of candidates and an unbounded number of manipulators.