Related papers: Temporal Evolution of Risk Behavior in a Disease S…
Evolution of disease in a large population is a function of the top-down policy measures from a centralized planner, as well as the self-interested decisions (to be socially active) of individual agents in a large heterogeneous population.…
Sexually transmitted infections (STIs) continue to present a complex and costly challenge to public health programs. The preferences and social dynamics of a population can have a large impact on the course of an outbreak as well as the…
Cooperation and competition between human players in repeated microeconomic games offer a powerful window onto social phenomena such as the establishment, breakdown and repair of trust. This offers the prospect of particular insight into…
Empirical evidence shows that human behaviour often deviates from game-theoretical rationality. For instance, humans may hold unrealistic expectations about future outcomes. As the evolutionary roots of such biases remain unclear, we…
Addressing both natural and societal challenges requires collective cooperation. Studies on collective-risk social dilemmas have shown that individual decisions are influenced by the perceived risk of collective failure. However, existing…
In this paper we consider non-atomic games in populations that are provided with a choice of preventive policies to act against a contagion spreading amongst interacting populations, be it biological organisms or connected computing…
We present and analyze an actively controlled Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (actSIS) model of interconnected populations to study how risk aversion strategies, such as social distancing, affect network epidemics. A population using a…
When microbes compete for limited resources, they often engage in chemical warfare using bacterial toxins. This competition can be understood in terms of evolutionary game theory (EGT). We study the predictions of EGT for the bacterial…
In randomized controlled trials (RCTs) of infectious disease interventions, it is well recognized that unmeasured individual heterogeneity at baseline can induce selection bias over time, thereby complicating the interpretation of the…
In this paper, we show how a dynamic population game can model the strategic interaction and migration decisions made by a large population of agents in response to epidemic prevalence. Specifically, we consider a modified…
The spread of an infection on a real-world social network is determined by the interplay of two processes: the dynamics of the network, whose structure changes over time according to the encounters between individuals, and the dynamics on…
Epidemic outbreaks of new pathogens, or known pathogens in new populations, cause a great deal of fear because they are hard to predict. For theoretical models of disease spreading, on the other hand, quantities characterizing the outbreak…
Random walks are powerful tools to analyze spatial-temporal patterns produced by living organisms ranging from cells to humans. At the same time, it is evident that these patterns are not completely random but are results of a convolution…
Evolutionary graph theory is a well established framework for modelling the evolution of social behaviours in structured populations. An emerging consensus in this field is that graphs that exhibit heterogeneity in the number of connections…
The spreading dynamics of an epidemic and the collective behavioral pattern of the population over which it spreads are deeply intertwined and the latter can critically shape the outcome of the former. Motivated by this, we design a…
We investigate the evolution of epidemics over dynamical networks when nodes choose to interact with others in a selfish and decentralized manner. Specifically, we analyze the susceptible-asymptomatic-infected-recovered (SAIR) epidemic in…
The adoption of prophylaxis attitudes, such as social isolation and use of face masks, to mitigate epidemic outbreaks strongly depends on the support of the population. In this work, we investigate a susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR)…
Evolutionary game dynamics describes not only frequency dependent genetical evolution, but also cultural evolution in humans. In this context, successful strategies spread by imitation. It has been shown that the details of strategy update…
Given a large population of players, each player has three possible choices between option 1 or 2 or no option. The two options are equally favorable and the population has to reach consensus on one of the two options quickly and in a…
Motivated by epidemics such as COVID-19, we study the spread of a contagious disease when behavior responds to the disease's prevalence. We extend the SIR epidemiological model to include endogenous meeting rates. Individuals benefit from…