Related papers: Nash implementation in a many-to-one matching mark…
We study stability notions for networked many-to-many matching markets with individually insignificant agents in distributional form. Outcomes are formulated as joint distributions over characteristics of agents and contract choices.…
We study equilibrium concepts in non-cooperative games under uncertainty where both beliefs and mixed strategies are represented by non-additive measures (capacities). In contrast to the classical Nash framework based on additive…
This paper explores aggregative games in a network of general linear systems subject to external disturbances. To deal with external disturbances, distributed strategy-updating rules based on internal model are proposed for the case with…
We consider static finite-player network games and their continuum analogs, graphon games. Existence and uniqueness results are provided, as well as convergence of the finite-player network game optimal strategy profiles to their analogs…
Traders in a market typically have widely different, private information on the return of an asset. The equilibrium price of the asset may reflect this information more accurately if the number of traders is large enough compared to the…
We consider the provision of public goods on networks of strategic agents. We study different effort outcomes of these network games, namely, the Nash equilibria, Pareto efficient effort profiles, and semi-cooperative equilibria (effort…
We apply Blackwell optimality to repeated games. An equilibrium whose strategy profile is sequentially rational for all high enough discount factors simultaneously is a Blackwell (subgame-perfect, perfect public, etc.) equilibrium. The bite…
Even when confronted with the same data, agents often disagree on a model of the real-world. Here, we address the question of how interacting heterogenous agents, who disagree on what model the real-world follows, optimize their trading…
Trading algorithms that execute large orders are susceptible to exploitation by order anticipation strategies. This paper studies the influence of order anticipation strategies in a multi-investor model of optimal execution under transient…
Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…
We propose a solution and a mechanism for two-agent social choice problems with large (infinite) policy spaces. Our solution is an efficient compromise rule between the two agents, built on a common cardinalization of their preferences. Our…
We study many-to-one matching problems between institutions and individuals, where each institution may be matched to multiple individuals. The matching market includes couples, who view pairs of institutions as complementary. Institutions'…
This paper studies two-sided many-to-one matching in which firms have complementary preferences. We show that stable matchings exist under a balancedness condition that rules out a specific type of odd-length cycles formed by firms'…
We investigate a portfolio selection problem involving multi competitive agents, each exhibiting mean-variance preferences. Unlike classical models, each agent's utility is determined by their relative wealth compared to the average wealth…
We present a framework for computing approximate mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of continuous-action games. It is a modification of the traditional double oracle algorithm, extended to multiple players and continuous action spaces. Unlike…
Secure equilibrium is a refinement of Nash equilibrium, which provides some security to the players against deviations when a player changes his strategy to another best response strategy. The concept of secure equilibrium is specifically…
Several notions of game enjoy a Nash-like notion of equilibrium without guarantee of existence. There are different ways of weakening a definition of Nash-like equilibrium in order to guarantee the existence of a weakened equilibrium.…
We investigate the behavior of equilibria in an $M/M/1$ feedback queue where price and time sensitive customers are homogeneous with respect to service valuation and cost per unit time of waiting. Upon arrival, customers can observe the…
We study a static game played by a finite number of agents, in which agents are assigned independent and identically distributed random types and each agent minimizes its objective function by choosing from a set of admissible actions that…
We introduce the LLM-Nash framework, a game-theoretic model where agents select reasoning prompts to guide decision-making via Large Language Models (LLMs). Unlike classical games that assume utility-maximizing agents with full rationality,…