Related papers: Hardware Trojans in Power Conversion Circuits
Several difficulties will appear when typical electromagnetic transient simulation, using the implicit trapezoidal method and fixed step sizes, is applied to power systems with switching behaviors. These difficulties are addressed by…
The power consumption of a microprocessor is a huge channel for information leakage. While the most popular exploitation of this channel is to recover cryptographic keys from embedded devices, other applications such as mobile app…
The globalization of the semiconductor industry has introduced security challenges to Integrated Circuits (ICs), particularly those related to the threat of Hardware Trojans (HTs) - malicious logic that can be introduced during IC…
Power integrity is becoming increasingly relevant due to increases in device functionality and switching speeds along with reduced operating voltage. Large current spikes at the device terminals result in electromagnetic disturbances which…
True random number generators (TRNGs) are essential components of cryptographic designs, which are used to generate private keys for encryption and authentication, and are used in masking countermeasures. In this work, we present a…
The development of quantum computers has been advancing rapidly in recent years. As quantum computers become more widely accessible, potentially malicious users could try to execute their code on the machines to leak information from other…
Implementation security, higher generation rate, and lower cost are primary missions in the domain of quantum key distributions in recent years. However, simultaneously achieving robust security, high speed, and low cost often resembles an…
Hardware Trojans are malicious modifications in digital designs that can be inserted by untrusted supply chain entities. Hardware Trojans can give rise to diverse attack vectors such as information leakage (e.g. MOLES Trojan) and…
Safety-critical sensors in autonomous vehicles (AVs) form an essential part of the vehicle's trusted computing base (TCB), yet they are highly susceptible to attacks. Alarmingly, Tier 1 manufacturers have already exposed vulnerabilities to…
Side-channel and fault injection attacks reveal secret information by monitoring or manipulating the physical effects of computations involving secret variables. Circuit-level countermeasures help to deter these attacks, and traditionally…
Advances in reverse engineering make it challenging to deploy any on-chip information in a way that is hidden from a determined attacker. A variety of techniques have been proposed for design obfuscation including look-alike cells in which…
Research on transient execution attacks including Spectre and Meltdown showed that exception or branch misprediction events might leave secret-dependent traces in the CPU's microarchitectural state. This observation led to a proliferation…
Gate bias stress instability in organic field-effect transistors (OFETs) is a major conceptual and device issue. This effect manifests itself by an undesirable shift of the transfer characteristics and is associated with long term charge…
Positive-feedback (PF) device and its operation scheme to implement pulse width modulation (PWM) function was proposed and demonstrated, and the device operation mechanism for implementing PWM function was analyzed. By adjusting the amount…
Recent works found that deep neural networks (DNNs) can be fooled by adversarial examples, which are crafted by adding adversarial noise on clean inputs. The accuracy of DNNs on adversarial examples will decrease as the magnitude of the…
Logic locking and hardware Trojans are two fields in hardware security that have been mostly developed independently from each other. In this paper, we identify the relationship between these two fields. We find that a common structure that…
Over the past few years, several research groups have introduced innovative hardware designs for Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), aiming to secure applications against potentially compromised privileged software, including the kernel.…
We introduce a new class of hardware trojans called interrupt-resilient trojans (IRTs). Our work is motivated by the observation that hardware trojan attacks on CPUs, even under favorable attack scenarios (e.g., an attacker with local…
The security of quantum communication using a weak coherent source requires an accurate knowledge of the source's mean photon number. Finite calibration precision or an active manipulation by an attacker may cause the actual emitted photon…
We study potential security vulnerabilities of a single-photon detector based on superconducting transition-edge sensor. In a simple experiment, we show that an adversary could fake a photon number result at a certain wavelength by sending…