Related papers: Graphical One-Sided Markets with Exchange Costs

We model an informed agent with information about the future value of an asset trying to maximize profits when subjected to a transaction cost as well as a market maker tasked with setting fair transaction prices. In a single auction model,…

This paper is concerned with general spatially explicit versions of three stochastic models for the dynamics of money that have been introduced and studied numerically by statistical physicists: the uniform reshuffling model, the immediate…

We present a new approach, called a lazy matching, to the problem of on-line matching on bipartite graphs. Imagine that one side of a graph is given and the vertices of the other side are arriving on-line. Originally, incoming vertex is…

This paper presents a novel study on gas-like models for economic systems. The interacting agents and the amount of exchanged money at each trade are selected with different levels of randomness, from a purely random way to a more chaotic…

The rise of the machine learning (ML) model economy has intertwined markets for training datasets and pre-trained models. However, most pricing approaches still separate data and model transactions or rely on broker-centric pipelines that…

We propose a pseudo-market solution to resource allocation problems subject to constraints. Our treatment of constraints is general: including bihierarchical constraints due to considerations of diversity in school choice, or scheduling in…

Weighted reciprocity between two agents can be defined as the minimum of sending and receiving value in their bilateral relationship. In financial networks, such reciprocity characterizes the importance of individual banks as both liquidity…

We study the distortion of one-sided and two-sided matching problems on the line. In the one-sided case, $n$ agents need to be matched to $n$ items, and each agent's cost in a matching is their distance from the item they were matched to.…

This paper considers the ideal gas-like model of trading markets, where each individual is identified as a gas molecule that interacts with others trading in elastic or money-conservative collisions. Traditionally this model introduces…

We study a setting where a set of agents engage in pairwise exchanges of freely replicable goods (e.g., digital goods such as data), where two agents grant each other a copy of a good they possess in exchange for a good they lack. Such…

It is well known that a stable matching in a many-to-one matching market with couples need not exist. We introduce a new matching algorithm for such markets and show that for a general class of large random markets the algorithm will find a…

We present a novel agent-based approach to simulating an over-the-counter (OTC) financial market in which trades are intermediated solely by market makers and agent visibility is constrained to a network topology. Dynamics, such as changes…

We consider a general small-scale market for agent-to-agent resource sharing, in which each agent could either be a server (seller) or a client (buyer) in each time period. In every time period, a server has a certain amount of resources…

Many-to-one matching markets exist in numerous different forms, such as college admissions, matching medical interns to hospitals for residencies, assigning housing to college students, and the classic firms and workers market. In all these…

Motivated by real-world applications, we study the fair allocation of graphical resources, where the resources are the vertices in a graph. Upon receiving a set of resources, an agent's utility equals the weight of a maximum matching in the…

We consider a market in which both suppliers and consumers compete for a product via scalar-parameterized supply offers and demand bids. Scalar-parameterized offers/bids are appealing due to their modeling simplicity and desirable…

We present an experimental study of decentralized two-sided matching markets with no transfers. Experimental participants are informed of everyone's preferences and can make arbitrary non-binding match offers that get finalized when a…

Matching platforms, from ridesharing to food delivery to competitive gaming, face a fundamental operational dilemma: match agents immediately to minimize waiting costs, or delay to exploit the efficiency gains of thicker markets. Yet…

Dealers in foreign exchange markets provide bid and ask prices to their clients at which they are happy to buy and sell, respectively. To manage risk, dealers can skew their quotes and hedge in the interbank market. Hedging offers certainty…

The assignment game models a housing market where buyers and sellers are matched, and transaction prices are set so that the resulting allocation is stable. Shapley and Shubik showed that every stable allocation is necessarily built on a…