Related papers: Graphical One-Sided Markets with Exchange Costs
Stable matching, a classical model for two-sided markets, has long been studied with little consideration for how each side's preferences are learned. With the advent of massive online markets powered by data-driven matching platforms, it…
When several two-sided matching markets merge into one, it is inevitable that some agents will become worse off if the matching mechanism used is stable. I formalize this observation by defining the property of integration monotonicity,…
We study a dynamic non-bipartite matching problem. There is a fixed set of agent types, and agents of a given type arrive and depart according to type-specific Poisson processes. Agent departures are not announced in advance. The value of a…
A central challenge in mechanism design is to develop truthful trade mechanisms that maximize the expected gains-from-trade (GFT) in two-sided markets with strategic agents. As achieving the full GFT is generally impossible, much of the…
This paper studies multilateral matching in which agents may negotiate contracts within any coalition. We assume scale economies such that an agent substitutes some existing contracts with new ones only if the latter involve a set of…
Interaction strategies for reward in competitive environments are significantly influenced by the nature and extent of available information. In financial markets, particularly foreign exchange (forex), traders operate independently with…
We consider a market consisting of one safe and one risky asset, which offer constant investment opportunities. Taking into account both proportional transaction costs and linear price impact, we derive optimal rebalancing policies for…
We consider a one-sided assignment market or exchange network with transferable utility and propose a model for the dynamics of bargaining in such a market. Our dynamical model is local, involving iterative updates of 'offers' based on…
We study data exchange among strategic agents without monetary transfers, motivated by domains such as research consortia and healthcare collaborations where payments are infeasible or restricted. The central challenge is to reap the…
The Hylland-Zeckhauser gave a classic pricing-based mechanism (HZ) for a one-sided matching market; it yields allocations satisfying Pareto optimality and envy-freeness (Hylland and Zeckhauser, 1979), and the mechanism is incentive…
A dynamic bipartite matching model is given by a bipartite matching graph which determines the possible matchings between the various types of supply and demand items. Both supply and demand items arrive to the system according to a…
Exchange markets are a significant type of market economy, in which each agent holds a budget and certain (divisible) resources available for trading. Most research on equilibrium in exchange economies is based on an environment of…
We study the problem of designing a two-sided market (double auction) to maximize the gains from trade (social welfare) under the constraints of (dominant-strategy) incentive compatibility and budget-balance. Our goal is to do so for an…
The stable matching problem is a prototype model in economics and social sciences where agents act selfishly to optimize their own satisfaction, subject to mutually conflicting constraints. A stable matching is a pairing of adjacent…
This paper is concerned with a model in econophysics, the subfield of statistical physics that applies concepts from traditional physics to economics. In our model, economical agents are represented by the vertices of a connected graph and…
We study gains from trade in multi-dimensional two-sided markets. Specifically, we focus on a setting with $n$ heterogeneous items, where each item is owned by a different seller $i$, and there is a constrained-additive buyer with…
Matching markets are of particular interest in computer science and economics literature as they are often used to model real-world phenomena where we aim to equitably distribute a limited amount of resources to multiple agents and…
A well known result states that stability criterion for matchings in two-sided markets doesn't ensure uniqueness. This opens the door for a moral question with regard to the optimal stable matching from a social point of view. Here, a new…
Assignment games represent a tractable yet versatile model of two-sided markets with transfers. We study the likely properties of the core of randomly generated assignment games. If the joint productivities of every firm and worker are…
This paper proposes a spatial model with a realistic geography where a continuous distribution of agents (e.g., farmers) engages in economic interactions with one location from a finite set (e.g., cities). The spatial structure of the…