Related papers: CryptoVampire: Automated Reasoning for the Complet…

This document presents the security protocol verifier CryptoVerif.CryptoVerif does not rely on the symbolic, Dolev-Yao model, but on the computational model. It can verify secrecy, correspondence (which include authentication), and…

This thesis presents an automated method for verifying security properties of protocol implementations written in the C language. We assume that each successful run of a protocol follows the same path through the C code, justified by the…

Recently, interest has been emerging in the application of symbolic techniques to the specification and analysis of cryptosystems. These techniques, when accompanied by suitable proofs of soundness/completeness, can be used both to identify…

Consider the problem of verifying security properties of a cryptographic protocol coded in C. We propose an automatic solution that needs neither a pre-existing protocol description nor manual annotation of source code. First, symbolically…

Cryptographic protocols play a fundamental role in securing modern digital infrastructure, but they are often deployed without prior formal verification. This could lead to the adoption of distributed systems vulnerable to attack vectors.…

We describe how to verify security properties of C code for cryptographic protocols by using a general-purpose verifier. We prove security theorems in the symbolic model of cryptography. Our techniques include: use of ghost state to attach…

Cryptographic algorithms are fundamental to modern security, yet their implementations frequently harbor subtle logic flaws that are hard to detect. We introduce CryptoScope, a novel framework for automated cryptographic vulnerability…

We propose a security verification framework for cryptographic protocols using machine learning. In recent years, as cryptographic protocols have become more complex, research on automatic verification techniques has been focused on. The…

Current formal verification of security protocols relies on specialized researchers and complex tools, inaccessible to protocol designers who informally evaluate their work with emulators. This paper addresses this gap by embedding symbolic…

We present the Foundational Cryptography Framework (FCF) for developing and checking complete proofs of security for cryptographic schemes within a proof assistant. This is a general-purpose framework that is capable of modeling and…

We introduce CryptoBap, a platform to verify weak secrecy and authentication for the (ARMv8 and RISC-V) machine code of cryptographic protocols. We achieve this by first transpiling the binary of protocols into an intermediate…

When large AI models are deployed as cloud-based services, clients have no guarantee that responses are correct or were produced by the intended model. Rerunning inference locally is infeasible for large models, and existing cryptographic…

We set up a framework for the formal proofs of RFID protocols in the computational model. We rely on the so-called computationally complete symbolic attacker model. Our contributions are: i) To design (and prove sound) axioms reflecting the…

Quantum protocols such as the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution protocol exchange qubits to achieve information-theoretic security guarantees. Many variants thereof were proposed, some of them being already deployed. Existing security proofs in…

Computer-aided analysis of security protocols heavily relies on equational theories to model cryptographic primitives. Most automated verifiers for security protocols focus on equational theories that satisfy the Finite Variant Property…

Cybersecurity demands rigorous and scalable techniques to ensure system correctness, robustness, and resilience against evolving threats. Automated reasoning, encompassing formal logic, theorem proving, model checking, and symbolic…

Informal arguments that cryptographic protocols are secure can be made rigorous using inductive definitions. The approach is based on ordinary predicate calculus and copes with infinite-state systems. Proofs are generated using…

Although good encryption functions are probabilistic, most symbolic models do not capture this aspect explicitly. A typical solution, recently used to prove the soundness of such models with respect to computational ones, is to explicitly…

This paper reports on the development of a formal symbolic process virtual machine (FSPVM) denoted as FSPVM-E for verifying the reliability and security of Ethereum-based services at the source code level of smart contracts, and a Coq proof…

Cryptographic verification is essential for establishing trust in quantum-computing-as-a-service. However, a fundamental gap exists in the current verification landscape: existing efficient protocols are largely restricted to decision…