Related papers: Interviewing Matching in Random Markets
We revisit the well-studied problem of designing mechanisms for one-sided matching markets, where a set of $n$ agents needs to be matched to a set of $n$ heterogeneous items. Each agent $i$ has a value $v_{i,j}$ for each item $j$, and these…
In many labor markets, workers and firms are connected via affiliative relationships. A management consulting firm wishes to both accept the best new workers but also place its current affiliated workers at strong firms. Similarly, a…
This paper studies a decentralized many-to-one matching market where preferences remain uncertain during the matching process. Institutions initiate matching by sending offers, and applicants decide whether to accept upon receiving them.…
We introduce a constrained priority mechanism that combines outcome-based matching from machine-learning with preference-based allocation schemes common in market design. Using real-world data, we illustrate how our mechanism could be…
Matching plays a vital role in the rational allocation of resources in many areas, ranging from market operation to people's daily lives. In economics, the term matching theory is coined for pairing two agents in a specific market to reach…
We introduce a simple benchmark model of dynamic matching in networked markets, where agents arrive and depart stochastically and the network of acceptable transactions among agents forms a random graph. We analyze our model from three…
The recruitment process is a slow and inefficient one at best, and a potentially ineffective one at worst. Matching candidates to jobs is one thing, but matching candidates with jobs alongside appropriate expectations and taking into…
The development and deployment of matching procedures that incentivize truthful preference reporting is considered one of the major successes of market design research. In this study, we test the degree to which these procedures succeed in…
We study the problem of online learning in competitive settings in the context of two-sided matching markets. In particular, one side of the market, the agents, must learn about their preferences over the other side, the firms, through…
Stable matching is a fundamental area with many practical applications, such as centralised clearinghouses for school choice or job markets. Recent work has introduced the paradigm of near-feasibility in capacitated matching settings, where…
Matching market models ignore prior commitments. Yet many job seekers, for example, are already employed, and the same holds for many other matching markets. I analyze two-sided matching markets with pre-existing binding agreements between…
Job search through online matching engines nowadays are very prominent and beneficial to both job seekers and employers. But the solutions of traditional engines without understanding the semantic meanings of different resumes have not kept…
In a dynamic matching market, such as a marriage or job market, how should agents balance accepting a proposed match with the cost of continuing their search? We consider this problem in a discrete setting, in which agents have cardinal…
Results from the communication complexity literature have demonstrated that stable matching requires communication: one cannot find or verify a stable match without having access to essentially all of the ordinal preference information held…
We present an experimental study of decentralized two-sided matching markets with no transfers. Experimental participants are informed of everyone's preferences and can make arbitrary non-binding match offers that get finalized when a…
Language model benchmarks are pervasive and computationally-efficient proxies for real-world performance. However, many recent works find that benchmarks often fail to predict real utility. Towards bridging this gap, we introduce benchmark…
Prediction markets are designed to elicit information from multiple agents in order to predict (obtain probabilities for) future events. A good prediction market incentivizes agents to reveal their information truthfully; such incentive…
We study the stable matching problem under the random matching model where the preferences of the doctors and hospitals are sampled uniformly and independently at random. In a balanced market with $n$ doctors and $n$ hospitals, the…
Recruitment in large organisations often involves interviewing a large number of candidates. The process is resource intensive and complex. Therefore, it is important to carry it out efficiently and effectively. Planning the selection…
The United States labor market exhibits a persistent coexistence of high job vacancy rates and prolonged unemployment duration, a pattern that standard labor market theory struggles to explain. This paper argues that a non-trivial portion…