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We consider the problem of dividing limited resources to individuals arriving over $T$ rounds. Each round has a random number of individuals arrive, and individuals can be characterized by their type (i.e. preferences over the different…
Online allocation problems with resource constraints have a rich history in operations research. In this paper, we introduce the \emph{regularized online allocation problem}, a variant that includes a non-linear regularizer acting on the…
When multiple users share a common link in direct transmission, packet loss and network collision may occur due to the simultaneous arrival of traffics at the source node. To tackle this problem, users may resort to an indirect path: the…
Ensuring that large language models (LLMs) are both helpful and harmless is a critical challenge, as overly strict constraints can lead to excessive refusals, while permissive models risk generating harmful content. Existing approaches,…
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that…
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among agents with additive valuations. The extent of fairness of an allocation is measured by its Nash social welfare, which is the geometric mean of the valuations of the…
The sustainable growth of EVs will have to be met with proportional growth in EV charging infrastructure. With limited urban spaces to place new charging stations, shrinking profitability, privately owned charging facilities need to be…
We consider caching in cellular networks in which each base station is equipped with a cache that can store a limited number of files. The popularity of the files is known and the goal is to place files in the caches such that the…
It is often beneficial for agents to pool their resources in order to better accommodate fluctuations in individual demand. Many multi-round resource allocation mechanisms operate in an online manner: in each round, the agents specify their…
The aggregation of conflicting preferences is a central problem in multiagent systems. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely. Mechanism design is the art of designing the rules of the game so that…
Civic Crowdfunding (CC) uses the ``power of the crowd'' to garner contributions towards public projects. As these projects are non-excludable, agents may prefer to ``free-ride,'' resulting in the project not being funded. For single project…
We study mechanism design problems in the {\em ordinal setting} wherein the preferences of agents are described by orderings over outcomes, as opposed to specific numerical values associated with them. This setting is relevant when agents…
When trying to solve a computational problem, we are often faced with a choice between algorithms that are guaranteed to return the right answer but differ in their runtime distributions (e.g., SAT solvers, sorting algorithms). This paper…
The Nash social welfare (NSW) is a well-known social welfare measurement that balances individual utilities and the overall efficiency. In the context of fair allocation of indivisible goods, it has been shown by Caragiannis et al. (EC 2016…
The classical linear ordering problem seeks a single ranking representing a given preference matrix. While suitable for homogeneous populations, it fails when observed preferences arise from several latent groups with distinct ranking…
Equipping current decision-making tools with notions of fairness, equitability, or other ethically motivated outcomes, is one of the top priorities in recent research efforts in machine learning, AI, and optimization. In this paper, we…
Multi-unit organizations are a form of organizations where the geographically dispersed units provide similar products or services in different markets. Deciding on an appropriate level of centralization in such organizations presents a…
Emerging methods for participatory algorithm design have proposed collecting and aggregating individual stakeholder preferences to create algorithmic systems that account for those stakeholders' values. Using algorithmic student assignment…
We study a two-sided matching model where one side of the market (hospitals) has combinatorial preferences over the other side (doctors). Specifically, we consider the setting where hospitals have matroid rank valuations over the doctors,…
Allocating conflicting jobs among individuals while respecting a budget constraint for each individual is an optimization problem that arises in various real-world scenarios. In this paper, we consider the situation where each individual…