Related papers: Affective interdependence and welfare
A network model based on players' aspirations is proposed and analyzed theoretically and numerically within the framework of evolutionary game theory. In this model, players decide whether to cooperate or defect by comparing their payoffs…
We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic…
Is it rational for selfish individuals to cooperate? The conventional answer based on analysis of games such as the Prisoners Dilemma (PD) is that it is not, even though mutual cooperation results in a better outcome for all. This…
We study network games in which players choose both the partners with whom they associate and an action level (e.g., effort) that creates spillovers for those partners. We introduce a framework and two solution concepts, extending standard…
I propose a flexible structural model to estimate peer effects across various quantiles of the peer outcome distribution. The model allows peers with low, intermediate, and high outcomes to exert distinct influences, thereby capturing more…
This paper discusses a special type of multi-user communication scenario, in which users' utilities are linearly impacted by their competitors' actions. First, we explicitly characterize the Nash equilibrium and Pareto boundary of the…
We consider a nonzero-sum N-player Markov game on an abstract measurable state space with compact metric action spaces. The payoff functions are bounded Carath\'eodory functions and the transitions of the system are assumed to have a…
Game-theoretic techniques and equilibria analysis facilitate the design and verification of competitive systems. While algorithmic complexity of equilibria computation has been extensively studied, practical implementation and application…
We present a network influence game that models players strategically seeding the opinions of nodes embedded in a social network. A social learning dynamic, whereby nodes repeatedly update their opinions to resemble those of their…
The paper studies properties of functional dependencies between strategies of players in Nash equilibria of multi-player strategic games. The main focus is on the properties of functional dependencies in the context of a fixed dependency…
The Nash equilibrium paradigm, and Rational Choice Theory in general, rely on agents acting independently from each other. This note shows how this assumption is crucial in the definition of Rational Choice Theory. It explains how a…
This paper investigates Nash equilibria (NEs) in multi-player turn-based games on graphs, where player preferences are modeled as $\omega$-automatic relations via deterministic parity automata. Unlike much of the existing literature, which…
In a strategic form game a strategy profile is an equilibrium if no viable coalition of agents (or players) benefits (in the Pareto sense) from jointly changing their strategies. Weaker or stronger equilibrium notions can be defined by…
In a multi-objective game, each individual's payoff is a \emph{vector-valued} function of everyone's actions. Under such vectorial payoffs, Pareto-efficiency is used to formulate each individual's best-response condition, inducing…
We study markets of indivisible items in which price-based (Walrasian) equilibria often do not exist due to the discrete non-convex setting. Instead we consider Nash equilibria of the market viewed as a game, where players bid for items,…
We study noncooperative games, in which each player's objective is composed of a sequence of ordered- and potentially conflicting-preferences. Problems of this type naturally model a wide variety of scenarios: for example, drivers at a busy…
We study how the structure of the interaction graph of a game affects the existence of pure Nash equilibria. In particular, for a fixed interaction graph, we are interested in whether there are pure Nash equilibria arising when random…
We consider a nonzero-sum Markov game on an abstract measurable state space with compact metric action spaces. The goal of each player is to maximize his respective discounted payoff function under the condition that some constraints on a…
We examine normal-form games in which players may \emph{pre-commit} to outcome-contingent transfers before choosing their actions. In the one-shot version of this model, Jackson and Wilkie showed that side contracting can backfire: even a…
Statistical mechanics is based on interplay between energy minimization and entropy maximization. Here we formalize this interplay via axioms of cooperative game theory (Nash bargaining) and apply it out of equilibrium. These axioms capture…