Related papers: Social Surplus Maximization in Sponsored Search Au…

We study the information design problem in a single-unit auction setting. The information designer controls independent private signals according to which the buyers infer their binary private values. Assuming that the seller adopts the…

Multi-round competitions often double or triple the points awarded in the final round, calling it a bonus, to maximize spectators' excitement. In a two-player competition with $n$ rounds, we aim to derive the optimal bonus size to maximize…

With the explosive growth of wireless data, the sheer size of the mobile traffic is challenging the capacity of current wireless systems. To tackle this challenge, mobile edge caching has emerged as a promising paradigm recently, in which…

We study the optimal auction design problem when bidders' preferences follow the maxmin expected utility model. We suppose that each bidder's set of priors consists of beliefs close to the seller's belief, where "closeness" is defined by a…

A competitive market is modeled as a game of incomplete information. One player observes some payoff-relevant state and can sell (possibly noisy) messages thereof to the other, whose willingness to pay is contingent on their own beliefs. We…

We study combinatorial auctions where each item is sold separately but simultaneously via a second price auction. We ask whether it is possible to efficiently compute in this game a pure Nash equilibrium with social welfare close to the…

With the growth of networks, promoting products through social networks has become an important problem. For auctions in social networks, items are needed to be sold to agents in a network, where each agent can bid and also diffuse the sale…

This work proposes a bid shading strategy for first-price auctions as a measure-valued optimization problem. We consider a standard parametric form for bid shading and formulate the problem as convex optimization over the joint distribution…

We present the results of detailed numerical study of a model for the sharing and sorting of informations in a community consisting of a large number of agents. The information gathering takes place in a sequence of mutual bipartite…

For decades, Simultaneous Ascending Auction (SAA) has been the most widely used mechanism for spectrum auctions, and it has recently gained popularity for allocating 5G licenses in many countries. Despite its relatively simple rules, SAA…

Online bidding serves as a fundamental information system in mobile ecosystems, facilitating real-time ad allocation across billions of devices while optimizing both platform performance and user experience through data-driven decision…

This paper studies one emerging procurement auction scenario where the market is constructed over the social networks. In a social network composed of many agents, smartphones or computers, one requester releases her requirement for goods…

This paper studies optimal auction design when valuations depend endogenously on post-auction collaboration between the seller and the winning bidder. Both parties exert non-contractible efforts after the auction, generating a double moral…

Strategic information is valuable either by remaining private (for instance if it is sensitive) or, on the other hand, by being used publicly to increase some utility. These two objectives are antagonistic and leaking this information might…

We consider the problem of an auctioneer who faces the task of selling a good (drawn from a known distribution) to a set of buyers, when the auctioneer does not have the capacity to describe to the buyers the exact identity of the good that…

Ad auctions in sponsored search support ``broad match'' that allows an advertiser to target a large number of queries while bidding only on a limited number. While giving more expressiveness to advertisers, this feature makes it challenging…

In sponsored search, a number of advertising slots is available on a search results page, and have to be allocated among a set of advertisers competing to display an ad on the page. This gives rise to a bipartite matching market that is…

Mature internet advertising platforms offer high-level campaign management tools to help advertisers run their campaigns, often abstracting away the intricacies of how each ad is placed and focusing on aggregate metrics of interest to…

Designing auctions to incentivize buyers to invite new buyers via their social connections is a new trend in mechanism design. The challenge is that buyers are competitors and we need to design proper incentives for them to invite each…

Internet search companies sell advertisement slots based on users' search queries via an auction. Advertisers have to determine how to place bids on the keywords of their interest in order to maximize their return for a given budget: this…