Related papers: Fair Price Discrimination

This paper proposes a theory of pricing premised upon the assumptions that customers dislike unfair prices---those marked up steeply over cost---and that firms take these concerns into account when setting prices. Since they do not observe…

We consider a platform facilitating trade between sellers and buyers with the objective of maximizing consumer surplus. Even though in many such marketplaces prices are set by revenue-maximizing sellers, platforms can influence prices…

In recent years, many new and interesting models of successful online business have been developed. Many of these are based on the competition between users, such as online auctions, where the product price is not fixed and tends to rise.…

Central to privacy concerns is that firms may use consumer data to price discriminate. A common policy response is that consumers should be given control over which firms access their data and how. Since firms learn about a consumer's…

In markets where algorithmic data processing is increasingly prevalent, recommendation algorithms can substantially affect trade and welfare. We consider a setting in which an algorithm recommends a product based on its value to the buyer…

Price differentiation describes a marketing strategy to determine the price of goods on the basis of a potential customer's attributes like location, financial status, possessions, or behavior. Several cases of online price differentiation…

We examine information structure design, also called "persuasion" or "signaling", in the presence of a constraint on the amount of communication. We focus on the fundamental setting of bilateral trade, which in its simplest form involves a…

We study the classic setting of envy-free pricing, in which a single seller chooses prices for its many items, with the goal of maximizing revenue once the items are allocated. Despite the large body of work addressing such settings, most…

We model a market in which nonstrategic vendors sell items of different types and offer bundles at discounted prices triggered by demand volumes. Each buyer acts strategically in order to maximize her utility, given by the difference…

We consider the problem of a single seller repeatedly selling a single item to a single buyer (specifically, the buyer has a value drawn fresh from known distribution $D$ in every round). Prior work assumes that the buyer is fully rational…

We introduce the study of designing allocation mechanisms for fairly allocating indivisible goods in settings with interdependent valuation functions. In our setting, there is a set of goods that needs to be allocated to a set of agents…

We divide efficiently a pile of indivisible goods in common property, using cash transfers to ensure fairness among agents with utility linear in money. We compare three cognitively feasible and privacy preserving division rules in terms of…

Algorithmic decision making systems are ubiquitous across a wide variety of online as well as offline services. These systems rely on complex learning methods and vast amounts of data to optimize the service functionality, satisfaction of…

We model a delivery platform facilitating transactions among three sides: buyers, stores, and couriers. In addition to buyers paying store-specific purchase prices and couriers receiving store--buyer-specific delivery compensation from the…

We consider the bilateral trade problem, in which two agents trade a single indivisible item. It is known that the only dominant-strategy truthful mechanism is the fixed-price mechanism: given commonly known distributions of the buyer's…

We consider a novel pricing and advertising framework, where a seller not only sets product price but also designs flexible 'advertising schemes' to influence customers' valuation of the product. We impose no structural restriction on the…

We present a recommender system based on the Random Utility Model. Online shoppers are modeled as rational decision makers with limited information, and the recommendation task is formulated as the problem of optimally enriching the…

We study the problem of selling a good to a group of bidders with interdependent values in a prior-free setting. Each bidder has a signal that can take one of $k$ different values, and her value for the good is a weakly increasing function…

In uniform-price markets, suppliers compete to supply a resource to consumers, resulting in a single market price determined by their competition. For sufficient flexibility, producers and consumers prefer to commit to a function as their…

We study economies where consumers interact independently with many monopolists. When consumer valuations over goods are correlated, correlation can distort the induced distribution of consumer surplus (information rents). We identify which…