Related papers: Schelling Games with Continuous Types
We represent the functioning of the housing market and study the relation between income segregation, income inequality and house prices by introducing a spatial Agent-Based Model (ABM). Differently from traditional models in urban…
In this paper we analyze urban spatial segregation phenomenon in terms of the income distribution over a population, and inflationary parameter weighting the evolution of housing prices. For this, we develop a discrete, spatially extended…
We explore extensions of Schelling's model of social dynamics, in which two types of agents live on a checkerboard lattice and move in order to optimize their own satisfaction, which depends on how many agents among their neighbors are of…
A version of the Schelling model on $\mathbb{Z}$ is defined, where two types of agents are allocated on the sites. An agent prefers to be surrounded by other agents of its own type, and may choose to move if this is not the case. It then…
Schelling's model of segregation, first described in 1969, has become one of the best known models of self-organising behaviour. While Schelling's explicit concern was to understand the mechanisms underlying racial segregation in large…
We derived the critical neighborhood demand in the Schelling's segregation model by studying the conditions for which a chain reaction of migrations of unsatisfied agents occurs. The essence of Schelling dynamics was approximated in two…
We propose a metapopulation version of the Schelling model where two kinds of agents relocate themselves, with unconstrained destination, if their local fitness is lower than a tolerance threshold. We show that, for small values of the…
In the simplest game-theoretic formulation of Schelling's model of segregation on graphs, agents of two different types each select their own vertex in a given graph so as to maximize the fraction of agents of their type in their occupied…
The strategic selection of resources by selfish agents has long been a key area of research, with Resource Selection Games and Congestion Games serving as prominent examples. In these traditional frameworks, agents choose from a set of…
This paper develops a game-theoretic model and an agent-based model to study group formation driven by resource pooling, spatial cohesion, and heterogeneity. We focus on cross-sector partnerships (CSPs) involving public, private, and…
The Schelling model is a prototype for agent-based modeling in social systems. We produce a comprehensive analysis of Schelling model rule variants by classifying the space of macroscopic outcomes using phase diagrams. Among 54 rule…
The strategic selection of resources by selfish agents is a classic research direction, with Resource Selection Games and Congestion Games as prominent examples. In these games, agents select available resources and their utility then…
Schelling's model of segregation is one of the first and most influential models in the field of social simulation. There are many variations of the model which have been proposed and simulated over the last forty years, though the present…
We consider a coalition formation setting where each agent belongs to one of the two types, and agents' preferences over coalitions are determined by the fraction of the agents of their own type in each coalition. This setting differs from…
This paper generalizes the original Schelling (1969, 1971a,b, 2006) model of racial and residential segregation to a context of variable externalities due to social linkages. In a setting in which individuals' utility function is a convex…
Schelling's model is an influential model that reveals how individual perceptions and incentives can lead to residential segregation. Inspired by a recent stream of work, we study welfare guarantees and complexity in this model with respect…
Segregation is widespread in all realms of human society. Several influential studies have argued that intolerance is not a prerequisite for a segregated society, and that segregation can arise even when people generally prefer diversity.…
Urban housing markets, along with markets of other assets, universally exhibit periods of strong price increases followed by sharp corrections. The mechanisms generating such non-linearities are not yet well understood. We develop an…
Schelling's model of segregation demonstrates that even in the absence of social or governmental interventions, individuals with mild in-group preferences can self-organize into strongly segregated neighborhoods. Many variants of this…
The Schelling model, introduced by Schelling in 1969 as a model for residential segregation in cities, describes how populations of multiple types self-organize to form homogeneous clusters of one type. In this model, vertices in an…