Related papers: Private Experimentation, Data Truncation, and Veri…
A private compression design problem is studied, where an encoder observes useful data $Y$, wishes to compress it using variable length code and communicates it through an unsecured channel. Since $Y$ is correlated with private data $X$,…
I study repeated communication games between a patient sender and a sequence of receivers. The sender has persistent private information about his psychological cost of lying, and in every period, can privately observe the realization of an…
We investigate a two-period Bayesian persuasion game, where the receiver faces a decision, akin to a one-armed bandit problem: to undertake an action, gaining noisy information and a corresponding positive or negative payoff, or to refrain.…
As the use of differential privacy (DP) becomes widespread, the development of effective tools for reasoning about the privacy guarantee becomes increasingly critical. In pursuit of this goal, we demonstrate novel relationships between DP…
In this paper we investigate the potential for persuasion arising from the quantum indeterminacy of a decision-maker's beliefs, a feature that has been proposed as a formal expression of well-known cognitive limitations. We focus on a…
The task of a telecloning protocol is to send an arbitrary qubit possessed by a sender to multiple receivers. Instead of performing Bell measurement at the sender's node, if one applies unsharp measurement, we show that the shared state can…
In this paper, we introduce the notion of Plausible Deniability in an information theoretic framework. We consider a scenario where an entity that eavesdrops through a broadcast channel summons one of the parties in a communication protocol…
We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the receiver's decision-making and signal the sender's information. Although full…
In this paper, we consider a discrete memoryless point to point channel with noisy feedback, where there is a sender with a private message that she wants to communicate to a receiver by sequentially transmitting symbols over a noisy…
In this paper the secrecy problem in the cognitive statedependent interference channel is considered. In this scenario we have a primary and a cognitive transmitter-receiver pairs. The cognitive transmitter has the message of the primary…
In Bayesian persuasion, an informed sender strategically discloses information to a receiver so as to persuade them to undertake desirable actions. Recently, a growing attention has been devoted to settings in which sender and receivers…
Information-theoretic arguments focus on modeling the reliability of information transmission, assuming availability of infinite data at sources, thus ignoring randomness in message generation times at the respective sources. However, in…
In this thesis we consider the problem of information hiding in the scenarios of interactive systems, statistical disclosure control, and refinement of specifications. We apply quantitative approaches to information flow in the first two…
Recent literature highlights the advantages of implementing social rules via dynamic game forms. We characterize when truth-telling remains a dominant strategy in gradual mechanisms implementing strategy-proof social rules, where agents…
We study goodness-of-fit and independence testing of discrete distributions in a setting where samples are distributed across multiple users. The users wish to preserve the privacy of their data while enabling a central server to perform…
A monopolistic seller aims to sell an indivisible item to multiple potential buyers. Each buyer's valuation depends on their private type and the item's quality. The seller can observe the quality but it is unknown to buyers. This quality…
This paper studies the role of hard information in contractual and market settings in which the receiver can flexibly adjust allocations and transfers in response to the sender's disclosure. These settings include monopoly pricing,…
A user's data is represented by a finite-valued random variable. Given a function of the data, a querier is required to recover, with at least a prescribed probability, the value of the function based on a query response provided by the…
An information theoretic privacy mechanism design problem for two scenarios is studied where the private data is either hidden or observable. In each scenario, privacy leakage constraints are considered using two different measures. In…
Two long-lived senders play a dynamic game of competitive persuasion. Each period, each provides information to a single short-lived receiver. When the senders also set prices, we unearth a folk theorem: if they are sufficiently patient,…