Related papers: Fair Multiwinner Elections with Allocation Constra…
We study the relationship between two central concepts in the allocation of divisible goods: competitive equilibrium (CE) and allocations that maximize Nash welfare, i.e., allocations where the weighted geometric mean of the utilities is…
This paper considers the scenario in which there are multiple institutions, each with a limited capacity for candidates, and candidates, each with preferences over the institutions. A central entity evaluates the utility of each candidate…
We model Monroe's and Chamberlin and Courant's multiwinner voting systems as a certain resource allocation problem. We show that for many restricted variants of this problem, under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions, there are no…
We study a type of reverse (procurement) auction problems in the presence of budget constraints. The general algorithmic problem is to purchase a set of resources, which come at a cost, so as not to exceed a given budget and at the same…
We study the complexity of (approximate) winner determination under the Monroe and Chamberlin--Courant multiwinner voting rules, which determine the set of representatives by optimizing the total (dis)satisfaction of the voters with their…
Multi-agent contract design has largely evaluated contracts through the lens of pure Nash equilibria (PNE). This focus, however, is not without loss: In general, the principal can strictly gain by recommending a complex, possibly…
We focus on a generalization of the classic Minisum approval voting rule, introduced by Barrot and Lang (2016), and referred to as Conditional Minisum (CMS), for multi-issue elections with preferential dependencies. Under this rule, voters…
We investigate a portfolio selection problem involving multi competitive agents, each exhibiting mean-variance preferences. Unlike classical models, each agent's utility is determined by their relative wealth compared to the average wealth…
We introduce a new framework to study the group dynamics and game-theoretic considerations when voters in a committee are allowed to trade votes. This model represents a significant step forward by considering vote-for-vote trades in a…
In approval-based multiwinner voting, voters express approval preferences over a set of candidates, and the goal is to return a winning committee. This model captures a broad range of subset selection problems under preferences. Prior work…
Sortition is based on the idea of choosing randomly selected representatives for decision making. The main properties that make sortition particularly appealing are fairness -- all the citizens can be selected with the same probability --…
Combinatorial auctions (CAs) allow bidders to express complex preferences for bundles of goods being auctioned. However, the behavior of bidders under different payment rules is often unclear. In this paper, we aim to understand how core…
Given a graph $G$, a community structure $\mathcal{C}$, and a budget $k$, the fair influence maximization problem aims to select a seed set $S$ ($|S|\leq k$) that maximizes the influence spread while narrowing the influence gap between…
A game-theoretic model is proposed to study the cross-layer problem of joint power and rate control with quality of service (QoS) constraints in multiple-access networks. In the proposed game, each user seeks to choose its transmit power…
Multi-winner approval elections are seen in a variety of settings ranging from academic societies and associations to public elections. In such elections, it is often the case that ballot-length restrictions are enforced; that is, where…
We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent optimizes its convex cost function subject to individual and coupling constraints. The constraint sets are compact convex subsets of a Euclidean space. To learn Nash equilibria, we…
We study a generic framework that provides a unified view on two important classes of problems: (i) extensions of the k-median problem where clients are interested in having multiple facilities in their vicinity (e.g., due to the fact that,…
We study approval-based committee voting from a novel perspective. While extant work largely centers around proportional representation of the voters, we shift our focus to the candidates while preserving proportionality. Intuitively,…
Computational tractability and social welfare (aka. efficiency) of equilibria are two fundamental but in general orthogonal considerations in algorithmic game theory. Nevertheless, we show that when (approximate) full efficiency can be…
We study strategic candidate nomination by parties in elections decided by Plurality voting. Each party selects a nominee before the election, and the winner is chosen from the nominated candidates based on the voters' preferences. We…