Related papers: Conditional dominance in games with unawareness
Given a dynamic ordinal game, we deem a strategy sequentially rational if there exist a Bernoulli utility function and a conditional probability system with respect to which the strategy is a maximizer. We establish a complete class theorem…
In the naming game, individuals or agents exchange pairwise local information in order to communicate about objects in their common environment. The goal of the game is to reach a consensus about naming these objects. Originally used to…
The Minority Game framework was recently generalized to account for the possibility that agents adapt not only through strategy selection but also by diversifying their response according to the kind of dynamical regime, or the risk, they…
Games have long been a microcosm for studying planning and reasoning in both natural and artificial intelligence, especially with a focus on expert-level or even super-human play. But real life also pushes human intelligence along a…
We consider an extension of strategic normal form games with a phase of negotiations before the actual play of the game, where players can make binding offers for transfer of utilities to other players after the play of the game, in order…
We study generalized games defined over Banach spaces using variational analysis. To reformulate generalized games as quasi-variational inequality problems, we will first form a suitable principal operator and study some significant…
Stackelberg equilibria have become increasingly important as a solution concept in computational game theory, largely inspired by practical problems such as security settings. In practice, however, there is typically uncertainty regarding…
Classify simple games into sixteen "types" in terms of the four conventional axioms: monotonicity, properness, strongness, and nonweakness. Further classify them into sixty-four classes in terms of finiteness (existence of a finite carrier)…
Although recent work in AI has made great progress in solving large, zero-sum, extensive-form games, the underlying assumption in most past work is that the parameters of the game itself are known to the agents. This paper deals with the…
The theory of learning in games has extensively studied situations where agents respond dynamically to each other by optimizing a fixed utility function. However, in real situations, the strategic environment varies as a result of past…
We investigate mean field game systems under invariance conditions for the state space, otherwise called {\it viability conditions} for the controlled dynamics. First we analyze separately the Hamilton-Jacobi and the Fokker-Planck…
We study the relationship between invariant transformations on extensive game structures and backward dominance procedure (BD), a generalization of the classical backward induction introduced in Perea (2014). We show that behavioral…
It is well known that no reasonable voting rule is strategyproof. Moreover, the common Plurality rule is particularly prone to strategic behavior of the voters and empirical studies show that people often vote strategically in practice.…
Two natural strategy elimination procedures have been studied for strategic games. The first one involves the notion of (strict, weak, etc) dominance and the second the notion of rationalizability. In the case of dominance the criterion of…
We revisit the crucial issue of natural game equivalences, and semantics of game logics based on these. We present reasons for investigating finer concepts of game equivalence than equality of standard powers, though staying short of modal…
Stochastic games are a natural model for the synthesis of controllers confronted to adversarial and/or random actions. In particular, $\omega$-regular games of infinite length can represent reactive systems which are not expected to reach a…
It is well known that a non-cooperative game may have multiple equilibria. In this paper we consider the efficiency of games, measured by the ratio between the aggregate payoff over all Nash equilibria and that over all admissible controls.…
A common assumption employed in most previous works on evolutionary game dynamics is that every individual player has full knowledge about and full access to the complete set of available strategies. In realistic social, economical, and…
We study the quality of outcomes in repeated games when the population of players is dynamically changing and participants use learning algorithms to adapt to the changing environment. Game theory classically considers Nash equilibria of…
Two-player zero-sum repeated games are well understood. Computing the value of such a game is straightforward. Additionally, if the payoffs are dependent on a random state of the game known to one, both, or neither of the players, the…