Related papers: Learning to Bid in Repeated First-Price Auctions w…
Simultaneous ascending auctions present agents with the exposure problem: bidding to acquire a bundle risks the possibility of obtaining an undesired subset of the goods. Auction theory provides little guidance for dealing with this…
Budget-management systems are one of the key components of modern auction markets. Internet advertising platforms typically offer advertisers the possibility to pace the rate at which their budget is depleted, through budget-pacing…
We study repeated bilateral trade when the valuations of the sellers and the buyers are contextual. More precisely, the agents' valuations are given by the inner product of a context vector with two unknown $d$-dimensional vectors -- one…
Motivated by pricing in ad exchange markets, we consider the problem of robust learning of reserve prices against strategic buyers in repeated contextual second-price auctions. Buyers' valuations for an item depend on the context that…
We study an online market-making problem in which a learner sequentially posts bid and ask prices for a single asset while interacting with traders holding private valuations. Unlike existing online learning formulations that assume fully…
We study the problem of online dynamic pricing with two types of fairness constraints: a "procedural fairness" which requires the proposed prices to be equal in expectation among different groups, and a "substantive fairness" which requires…
Motivated by online retail, we consider the problem of selling one item (e.g., an ad slot) to two non-excludable buyers (say, a merchant and a brand). This problem captures, for example, situations where a merchant and a brand cooperatively…
This paper studies some basic problems in a multiple-object auction model using methodologies from theoretical computer science. We are especially concerned with situations where an adversary bidder knows the bidding algorithms of all the…
We consider a setting where $n$ buyers, with combinatorial preferences over $m$ items, and a seller, running a priority-based allocation mechanism, repeatedly interact. Our goal, from observing limited information about the results of these…
Ad auctions in sponsored search support ``broad match'' that allows an advertiser to target a large number of queries while bidding only on a limited number. While giving more expressiveness to advertisers, this feature makes it challenging…
Auto-bidding systems are widely used in advertising to automatically determine bid values under constraints such as total budget and Return-on-Spend (RoS) targets. Existing works often assume that the value of an ad impression, such as the…
We study online bilateral trade, where a learner facilitates repeated exchanges between a buyer and a seller to maximize the Gain From Trade (GFT), i.e., the social welfare. In doing so, the learner must guarantee not to subsidize the…
Price-based revenue management is an important problem in operations management with many practical applications. The problem considers a retailer who sells a product (or multiple products) over $T$ consecutive time periods and is subject…
The real-time bidding (RTB), aka programmatic buying, has recently become the fastest growing area in online advertising. Instead of bulking buying and inventory-centric buying, RTB mimics stock exchanges and utilises computer algorithms to…
We study a two-sided market, wherein, price-sensitive heterogeneous customers and servers arrive and join their respective queues. A compatible customer-server pair can then be matched by the platform, at which point, they leave the system.…
We study the problem of learning revenue-optimal multi-bidder auctions from samples when the samples of bidders' valuations can be adversarially corrupted or drawn from distributions that are adversarially perturbed. First, we prove tight…
Major Internet advertising platforms offer budget pacing tools as a standard service for advertisers to manage their ad campaigns. Given the inherent non-stationarity in an advertiser's value and also competing advertisers' values over…
We consider the problem of repeatedly auctioning a single item to multiple i.i.d buyers who each use a no-regret learning algorithm to bid over time. In particular, we study the seller's optimal revenue, if they know that the buyers are…
In contextual dynamic pricing, a seller sequentially prices goods based on contextual information. Buyers will purchase products only if the prices are below their valuations. The goal of the seller is to design a pricing strategy that…
Budget constraints are ubiquitous in online advertisement auctions. To manage these constraints and smooth out the expenditure across auctions, the bidders (or the platform on behalf of them) often employ pacing: each bidder is assigned a…