Related papers: Choice Structures in Games
We study a simple example of a sequential game illustrating problems connected with making rational decisions that are universal for social sciences. The set of chooser's optimal decisions that manifest his preferences in case of a constant…
We establish relationships between various topological selection games involving the space of minimal usco maps with various topologies, including the topology of pointwise convergence and the topology of uniform convergence on compact…
We introduce open games as a compositional foundation of economic game theory. A compositional approach potentially allows methods of game theory and theoretical computer science to be applied to large-scale economic models for which…
Pursuing a new approach to the study of infinite games in combinatorics, we introduce the categories $\mathbf{Game}_{A}$ and $\mathbf{Game}_{B}$ and improve some classical results concerning topological games related to the duality between…
In this paper, we prove the existence of the equilibrium in choice for games in choice form. These games have recently been introduced by A. Stefanescu, M. Ferrara and M. V. Stefanescu. Our results link the recent research to the older…
The traditional mathematical model for an impartial combinatorial game is defined recursively as a set of the options of the game, where the options are games themselves. We propose a model called gamegraph, together with its generalization…
We extend the open games framework for compositional game theory to encompass also mixed strategies, making essential use of the discrete probability distribution monad. We show that the resulting games form a symmetric monoidal category,…
This work extends the present author's computational game semantics of Martin-L\"{o}f type theory to the cumulative hierarchy of universes. This extension completes game semantics of all standard types of Martin-L\"{o}f type theory for the…
We consider the dynamics, existence and stability of the equilibrium states for large populations of individuals who can play various types of non--cooperative games. The players imitate the most attractive strategies, and the choice is…
Although the definition of what empathetic preferences exactly are is still evolving, there is a general consensus in the psychology, science and engineering communities that the evolution toward players' behaviors in interactive…
Human cooperation depends on how accurately we infer others' motives--how much they value fairness, generosity, or self-interest from the choices they make. We model that process in binary dictator games, which isolate moral trade-offs…
The maintenance of cooperation in the presence of spatial restrictions has been studied extensively. It is well-established that the underlying graph topology can significantly influence the outcome of games on graphs. Maintenance of…
This work presents the selection principle $S_1^*(\tau_x,CD)$ that characterizes $q$-points. We also discuss the induced topological game $G_1^*(\tau_x,CD)$ and its relations with $W$-points and $\widetilde{W}$-points, as well as with the…
We study the game of go from a complex network perspective. We construct a directed network using a suitable definition of tactical moves including local patterns, and study this network for different datasets of professional tournaments…
Cooperative interval games are a generalized model of cooperative games in which the worth of every coalition corresponds to a closed interval representing the possible outcomes of its cooperation. Selections are all possible outcomes of…
We study a natural hierarchy in first-order logic, namely the quantifier structure hierarchy, which gives a systematic classification of first-order formulas based on structural quantifier resource. We define a variant of…
In the game theory literature, there appears to be little research on equilibrium selection for normal-form games with an infinite strategy space and discontinuous utility functions. Moreover, many existing selection methods are not…
Nguyen et al. [1] introduced altruistic hedonic games in which agents' utilities depend not only on their own preferences but also on those of their friends in the same coalition. We propose to extend their model to coalition formation…
Game theory relies heavily on the availability of cardinal utility functions, but in fields such as matching markets, only ordinal preferences are typically elicited. The literature focuses on mechanisms with simple dominant strategies, but…
We introduce the concept of Conversion/Preference Games, or CP games for short. CP games generalize the standard notion of strategic games. First we exemplify the use of CP games. Second we formally introduce and define the CP-games…