Related papers: Cost allocation problems on highways with grouped …
Self-interested behavior in sharing economies often leads to inefficient aggregate outcomes compared to a centrally coordinated allocation, ultimately harming users. Yet, centralized coordination removes individual decision power. This…
We consider a cooperative game defined by an economic lot-sizing problem with heterogeneous costs over a finite time horizon, in which each firm faces demand for a single product in each period and coalitions can pool orders. The model of…
This paper considers competitive mobility-on-demand systems where a group of vehicle sharing companies, on one hand, want to collectively regulate the traffic of the user queueing network, and on the other hand, maximize their own profits…
Mobility-on-demand systems are transforming the way we think about the transportation of people and goods. Most research effort has been placed on scalability issues for systems with a large number of agents and simple pick-up/drop-off…
In many social dilemmas, individuals tend to generate a situation with low payoffs instead of a system optimum ("tragedy of the commons"). Is the routing of traffic a similar problem? In order to address this question, we present…
In this study, we introduce a toll lane framework that optimizes the mixed flow of autonomous and high-occupancy vehicles on freeways, where human-driven and autonomous vehicles of varying commuter occupancy share a segment. Autonomous…
In this paper, we address the problem of fair sharing of the total value of a crowd-sourced network system between major participants (founders) and minor participants (crowd) using cooperative game theory. Shapley allocation is regarded as…
Transit agencies have the opportunity to outsource certain services to established Mobility-on-Demand (MOD) providers. Such alliances can improve service quality, coverage, and ridership; reduce public sector costs and vehicular emissions;…
We model and study the problem of assigning traffic in an urban road network infrastructure. In our model, each driver submits their intended destination and is assigned a route to follow that minimizes the social cost (i.e., travel…
Following the work of Lloyd Shapley on the Shapley value, and tangentially the work of Guillermo Owen, we offer an alternative non-probabilistic formulation of part of the work of Robert J. Weber in his 1978 paper "Probabilistic values for…
A key question in cooperative game theory is that of coalitional stability, usually captured by the notion of the \emph{core}--the set of outcomes such that no subgroup of players has an incentive to deviate. However, some coalitional games…
When users access shared resources in a selfish manner, the resulting societal cost and perceived users' cost is often higher than what would result from a centrally coordinated optimal allocation. While several contributions in mechanism…
The evolution of existing transportation systems, mainly driven by urbanization and increased availability of mobility options, such as private, profit-maximizing ride-hailing companies, calls for tools to reason about their design and…
Existing cooperative game theoretic studies of bargaining power in gas pipeline systems are based on the so called characteristic function form (CFF). This approach is potentially misleading if some pipelines fall under regulated third…
I explain how faculty members could exploit a method to allocate travel funds and how to use game theory to design a method that cannot be manipulated.
We consider a model of priced resource sharing that combines both queueing behavior and strategic behavior. We study a priority service model where a single server allocates its capacity to agents in proportion to their payment to the…
The transition to Electric Vehicles (EVs) demands intelligent, congestion-aware infrastructure planning to balance user convenience, economic viability, and traffic efficiency. We present a joint optimisation framework for EV Charging…
Incentives for early arrival (I4EA) was recently proposed for studying online cooperative games. In an online cooperative game, players arrive in an unknown order, and the value increase after each player arrived should be distributed…
Horizontal collaboration between operators can save traffic operation costs, a concept that has been particularly validated in the logistics field. Due to the increasing transportation demand and the introduction of charging times for…
In networking and computing, resource allocation is typically addressed using classical sharing protocols as, for instance, the proportional division rule, the max-min fair allocation , or other solutions inspired by cooperative game…