Related papers: Optimal Pricing Schemes for Identical Items with T…
A monopolistic seller aims to sell an indivisible item to multiple potential buyers. Each buyer's valuation depends on their private type and the item's quality. The seller can observe the quality but it is unknown to buyers. This quality…
A central challenge in using price signals to coordinate the electricity consumption of a group of users is the operator's lack of knowledge of the users due to privacy concerns. In this paper, we develop a two-time-scale incentive…
In the online (time-series) search problem, a player is presented with a sequence of prices which are revealed in an online manner. In the standard definition of the problem, for each revealed price, the player must decide irrevocably…
The optimal pricing problem is a fundamental problem that arises in combinatorial auctions. Suppose that there is one seller who has indivisible items and multiple buyers who want to purchase a combination of the items. The seller wants to…
We study a version of the classical Cayley-Moser optimal stopping problem, in which a seller must sell an asset by a given deadline, with the offers, which are independent random variables with a known distribution, arriving at random…
We show that the Revenue-Optimal Deterministic Mechanism Design problem for a single additive buyer is #P-hard, even when the distributions have support size 2 for each item and, more importantly, even when the optimal solution is…
When randomness in demand affects the sales of a product, retailers use dynamic pricing strategies to maximize their profits. In this article, we formulate the pricing problem as a continuous-time stochastic optimal control problem and find…
We consider an assortment optimization problem where a customer chooses a single item from a sequence of sets shown to her, while limited inventories constrain the items offered to customers over time. In the special case where all of the…
We consider a retailer selling a single product with limited on-hand inventory over a finite selling season. Customer demand arrives according to a Poisson process, the rate of which is influenced by a single action taken by the retailer…
We consider a robust version of the revenue maximization problem, where a single seller wishes to sell $n$ items to a single unit-demand buyer. In this robust version, the seller knows the buyer's marginal value distribution for each item…
At the ultra high frequency level, the notion of price of an asset is very ambiguous. Indeed, many different prices can be defined (last traded price, best bid price, mid price,...). Thus, in practice, market participants face the problem…
We consider an assortment selection and pricing problem in which a seller has $N$ different items available for sale. In each round, the seller observes a $d$-dimensional contextual preference information vector for the user, and offers to…
We consider the problem of devising incentive strategies for viral marketing of a product. In particular, we assume that the seller can influence penetration of the product by offering two incentive programs: a) direct incentives to…
In the past decade, many parameterized algorithms were developed for packing problems. Our goal is to obtain tradeoffs that improve the running times of these algorithms at the cost of computing approximate solutions. Consider a packing…
We provide a near-optimal, computationally efficient algorithm for the unit-demand pricing problem, where a seller wants to price n items to optimize revenue against a unit-demand buyer whose values for the items are independently drawn…
We consider the revenue management problem of finding profit-maximising prices for delivery time slots in the context of attended home delivery. This multi-stage optimal control problem admits a dynamic programming formulation that is…
In this paper we study a single machine scheduling problem with the objective of minimizing the sum of completion times. Each of the given jobs is either short or long. However the processing times are initially hidden to the algorithm, but…
We consider a novel pricing and advertising framework, where a seller not only sets product price but also designs flexible 'advertising schemes' to influence customers' valuation of the product. We impose no structural restriction on the…
We initiate the study of contextual dynamic pricing with a heterogeneous population of buyers, where a seller repeatedly posts prices (over $T$ rounds) that depend on the observable $d$-dimensional context and receives binary purchase…
In a single-parameter mechanism design problem, a provider is looking to sell a service to a group of potential buyers. Each buyer $i$ has a private value $v_i$ for receiving the service and a feasibility constraint restricts which sets of…