Related papers: Learning coordination through new actions

We study a repeated game with payoff externalities and observable actions where two players receive information over time about an underlying payoff-relevant state, and strategically coordinate their actions. Players learn about the true…

The standard game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium, assumes that all players behave rationally. If we follow a Nash equilibrium and opponents are irrational (or follow strategies from a different Nash equilibrium), then we may…

We introduce a new algorithm for the numerical computation of Nash equilibria of competitive two-player games. Our method is a natural generalization of gradient descent to the two-player setting where the update is given by the Nash…

Nash equilibrium is one of the most influential solution concepts in game theory. With the development of computer science and artificial intelligence, there is an increasing demand on Nash equilibrium computation, especially for Internet…

Multi-agent games are becoming an increasing prevalent formalism for the study of electronic commerce and auctions. The speed at which transactions can take place and the growing complexity of electronic marketplaces makes the study of…

We study a two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential game where one player controls the state variable via additive impulses while the other player can stop the game at any time. The main goal of this work is characterize Nash…

Static potential games are non-cooperative games which admit a fictitious function, also referred to as a potential function, such that the minimizers of this function constitute a subset (or a refinement) of the Nash equilibrium strategies…

We consider two-player non-zero-sum stopping games in discrete time. Unlike Dynkin games, in our games the payoff of each player is revealed after both players stop. Moreover, each player can adjust her own stopping strategy according to…

One key in real-life Nash equilibrium applications is to calibrate players' cost functions. To leverage the approximation ability of neural networks, we proposed a general framework for optimizing and learning Nash equilibrium using neural…

We study techniques to incentivize self-interested agents to form socially desirable solutions in scenarios where they benefit from mutual coordination. Towards this end, we consider coordination games where agents have different intrinsic…

An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences…

Under what conditions do the behaviors of players, who play a game repeatedly, converge to a Nash equilibrium? If one assumes that the players' behavior is a discrete-time or continuous-time rule whereby the current mixed strategy profile…

In order to coordinate players in a game must first identify a target pattern of behaviour. In this paper we investigate the difficulty of identifying prominent outcomes in two kinds of binary action coordination problems in social…

Learning in games considers how multiple agents maximize their own rewards through repeated games. Memory, an ability that an agent changes his/her action depending on the history of actions in previous games, is often introduced into…

We study pure-strategy Nash equilibria in multi-player concurrent deterministic games, for a variety of preference relations. We provide a novel construction, called the suspect game, which transforms a multi-player concurrent game into a…

In this paper, we consider a Nash equilibrium seeking problem for a class of high-order multi-agent systems with unknown dynamics. Different from existing results for single integrators, we aim to steer the outputs of this class of…

In this paper we consider strong Nash equilibria, in mixed strategies, for finite games. Any strong Nash equilibrium outcome is Pareto efficient for each coalition. First, we analyze the two--player setting. Our main result, in its simplest…

This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept "robust perfect equilibrium" for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed…

In many game-theoretic settings, agents are challenged with taking decisions against the uncertain behavior exhibited by others. Often, this uncertainty arises from multiple sources, e.g., incomplete information, limited computation,…

This paper considers a non-cooperative game in which competing users sharing a frequency-selective interference channel selfishly optimize their power allocation in order to improve their achievable rates. Previously, it was shown that a…