Related papers: Prophet Inequalities: Separating Random Order from…
In the online random-arrival model, an algorithm receives a sequence of n requests that arrive in a random order. The algorithm is expected to make an irrevocable decision with regard to each request based only on the observed history. We…
We study the problem of mechanism design for allocating a set of indivisible items among agents with private preferences on items. We are interested in such a mechanism that is strategyproof (where agents' best strategy is to report their…
The Ultimatum Game is a famous sequential, two-player game intensely studied in Game Theory. A proposer can offer a certain fraction of some amount of a valuable good, for example, money. A responder can either accept, in which case the…
We study the online unweighted bipartite matching problem in the random arrival order model, with $n$ offline and $n$ online vertices, in the learning-augmented setting: The algorithm is provided with untrusted predictions of the types…
We study a class of Bayesian online selection problems with matroid constraints. Consider a vendor who has several items to sell, with the set of sold items being subject to some structural constraints, e.g., the set of sold items should be…
In fair division of indivisible goods, using sequences of sincere choices (or picking sequences) is a natural way to allocate the objects. The idea is as follows: at each stage, a designated agent picks one object among those that remain.…
In the single stock trading prophet problem formulated by Correa et al.\ (2023), an online algorithm observes a sequence of prices of a stock. At each step, the algorithm can either buy the stock by paying the current price if it doesn't…
We study route choice in a repeated routing game where an uncertain state of nature determines link latency functions, and agents receive private route recommendation. The state is sampled in an i.i.d. manner in every round from a publicly…
We study matroid prophet inequalities when distributions are unknown and accessible only through samples. While single-sample prophet inequalities for special matroids are known, no constant-factor competitive algorithm with even a…
Online load balancing for heterogeneous machines aims to minimize the makespan (maximum machine workload) by scheduling arriving jobs with varying sizes on different machines. In the adversarial setting, where an adversary chooses not only…
We present prior robust algorithms for a large class of resource allocation problems where requests arrive one-by-one (online), drawn independently from an unknown distribution at every step. We design a single algorithm that, for every…
We consider the problem in which n items arrive to a market sequentially over time, where two agents compete to choose the best possible item. When an agent selects an item, he leaves the market and obtains a payoff given by the value of…
Most work in mechanism design assumes that buyers are risk neutral; some considers risk aversion arising due to a non-linear utility for money. Yet behavioral studies have established that real agents exhibit risk attitudes which cannot be…
We consider the problem of constructing probabilistic predictions that lead to accurate decisions when employed by downstream users to inform actions. For a single decision maker, designing an optimal predictor is equivalent to minimizing a…
Online contention resolution schemes (OCRSs) were proposed by Feldman, Svensson, and Zenklusen as a generic technique to round a fractional solution in the matroid polytope in an online fashion. It has found applications in several…
In this paper we consider the online Submodular Welfare (SW) problem. In this problem we are given $n$ bidders each equipped with a general (not necessarily monotone) submodular utility and $m$ items that arrive online. The goal is to…
This chapter introduces the \emph{random-order model} in online algorithms. In this model, the input is chosen by an adversary, then randomly permuted before being presented to the algorithm. This reshuffling often weakens the power of the…
Let X_1,X_2,... be a sequence of [0,1]-valued i.i.d. random variables, let c\geq 0 be a sampling cost for each observation and let Y_i=X_i-ic, i=1,2,.... For n=1,2,..., let M(Y_1,...,Y_n)=E(max_{1\leq i\leq n}Y_i) and…
Sellers in online markets face the challenge of determining the right time to sell in view of uncertain future offers. Classical stopping theory assumes that sellers have full knowledge of the value distributions, and leverage this…
We consider an atomic congestion game in which each player $i$ participates in the game with an exogenous and known probability $p_{i}\in(0,1]$, independently of everybody else, or stays out and incurs no cost. We compute the parameterized…