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In this article we propose a multi-zonal integrated energy-reserve market model. We assume that bidders may submit their demand and supply bids on the one hand in the form of conventional hourly step bids and block bids, which are cleared…
Urban food delivery services have become an integral part of daily life, yet their mobility and environmental externalities remain poorly addressed by planners. Most studies neglect whether consumers pay enough to internalize the broader…
This paper examines the effects of institutional quality on financing choice of individual using a large dataset of 137,160 people from 131 countries. We classify borrowing activities into three categories, including formal, constructive…
The selection of referees for evaluation of research projects under competitive financing appears particularly critical: the greater the competence of the referee concerning the core topic, the more their judgment is trustworthy and the…
This paper revisits the classic instrument choice problem in a setting with consumption externalities, through the lens of robust mechanism design. A regulator can implement any incentive-compatible policy but is uncertain about how…
Participatory budgeting is a popular method to engage residents in budgeting decisions by local governments. The Stanford Participatory Budgeting platform is an online platform that has been used to engage residents in more than 150…
The auction theory literature has so far focused mostly on the design of mechanisms that takes the revenue or the efficiency as a yardstick. However, scenarios where the {\it capacity}, which we define as \textit{``the number of bidders the…
We model a procurement scenario in which two \textit{imperfect} bidders act simultaneously on behalf of a single buyer, a configuration common in display advertising and referred to as \textit{side-by-side bidding} but largely unexplored in…
Sortition, i.e., random appointment for public duty, has been employed by societies throughout the years, especially for duties related to the judicial system, as a firewall designated to prevent illegitimate interference between parties in…
We study procurement design when the buyer is uncertain about both the value of the good and the seller's cost. The buyer has a conjectured model but does not fully trust it. She first identifies mechanisms that maximize her worst-case…
We study signaling in Bayesian ad auctions, in which bidders' valuations depend on a random, unknown state of nature. The auction mechanism has complete knowledge of the actual state of nature, and it can send signals to bidders so as to…
Polling systems have been widely studied, however most of these studies focus on polling systems with renewal processes for arrivals and random variables for service times. There is a need driven by practical applications to study polling…
Research funding through third-party financing is of considerable importance for the German science system. The funds of the German Research Foundation (DFG) serve as the central focus due to the high reputation of the foundation. However,…
Scientific research funding is allocated largely through a system of soliciting and ranking competitive grant proposals. In these competitions, the proposals themselves are not the deliverables that the funder seeks, but instead are used by…
Contestability -- the ability to effectively challenge a decision -- is critical to the implementation of fairness. In the context of governmental decision making about individuals, contestability is often constitutionally required as an…
A public decision-making problem consists of a set of issues, each with multiple possible alternatives, and a set of competing agents, each with a preferred alternative for each issue. We study adaptations of market economies to this…
Bias in grant allocation is a critical issue, as the expectation is that grants are given to the best researchers, and not to applicants that are socially, organizationally, or topic-wise near-by the decision-makers. In this paper, we…
Spectrum auctions are the primary mechanism through which governments allocate scarce radio frequencies, with outcomes that shape competition, coverage, and innovation in telecommunications markets. While traditional models of spectrum…
We consider the problem of budget feasible mechanism design proposed by Singer (2010), but in a Bayesian setting. A principal has a public value for hiring a subset of the agents and a budget, while the agents have private costs for being…
In this paper, we study the problem of learning to bid in repeated first-price auctions with budget constraints. In each period, the decision maker needs to submit a bid to win the auction and maximize the total collected reward, subject to…