Related papers: The Dynamics of Instability
Evolutionary game theory has been successfully used to investigate the dynamics of systems, in which many entities have competitive interactions. From a physics point of view, it is interesting to study conditions under which a coordination…
The paper considers a stabilizing stochastic control which can be applied to a variety of unstable and even chaotic maps. Compared to previous methods introducing control by noise, we relax assumptions on the class of maps, as well as…
We study the interplay between noise and a positive feedback mechanism in an excitable system that generates events. We show that such a system can exhibit a bistability in the dynamics of the event generation (states of low and high…
In the paper a simple discrete dynamical model for dynamics of two antagonistic agents (opponents) under iterated sanctions and counter-sanctions is proposed. The model is inspired with Osipov-Lanchester model for combats. Simple stability…
One of the proposed solutions to the equilibrium selection problem for agents learning in repeated games is obtained via the notion of stochastic stability. Learning algorithms are perturbed so that the Markov chain underlying the learning…
Our aim is to model a game for power as a dynamical process, where an excess of power possessed by a player allows him to gain even more power. Such a positive feedback is often termed as the Matthew effect. Analytical and numerical methods…
Individuals might abstain from participating in an instance of an evolutionary game for various reasons, ranging from lack of interest to risk aversion. In order to understand the consequences of such diverse activity patterns on the…
In multi-agent environments in which coordination is desirable, the history of play often causes lock-in at sub-optimal outcomes. Notoriously, technologies with a significant environmental footprint or high social cost persist despite the…
A new approach for the study of social games and communications is proposed. Games are simulated between cognitive players who build the opponent's internal model and decide their next strategy from predictions based on the model. In this…
When a system has more than one stable state, how can the stability of these states be compared? This deceptively simple question has important consequences for ecosystems, because systems with alternative stable states can undergo dramatic…
We propose a simple model that describes the dynamics of efficiencies of competing agents. Agents communicate leading to increase of efficiencies of underachievers, and an efficiency of each agent can increase or decrease irrespectively of…
This paper studies a dynamic discrete-time queuing model where at every period players get a new job and must send all their jobs to a queue that has a limited capacity. Players have an incentive to send their jobs as late as possible;…
We consider a version of large population games whose agents compete for resources using strategies with adaptable preferences. Diversity among the agents reduces their maladpative behavior. We find interesting scaling relations with…
The behavior of the network and its stability are governed by both dynamics of individual nodes as well as their topological interconnections. Attention mechanism as an integral part of neural network models was initially designed for…
Understanding the evolution of human social systems requires flexible formalisms for the emergence of institutions. Although game theory is normally used to model interactions individually, larger spaces of games can be helpful for modeling…
Attempts at predatory capture may provoke a defensive response that reduces the very value of the predated resource. We provide a game-theoretic analysis of simultaneous-move, two-player Attacker-Defender games that model such interactions.…
Coalition formation is concerned with the question of how to partition a set of agents into disjoint coalitions according to their preferences. Deviating from most of the previous work, we consider an online variant of the problem, where…
This paper presents a dynamic game framework to analyze the role of large banks in interbank markets. By extending existing models, we incorporate a large bank as a dynamic decision-maker interacting with multiple small banks. Using the…
We analyze inertial coordination games: dynamic coordination games with an endogenously changing state that depends on (i) a persistent fundamental players privately learn about over time; and (ii) past play. The speed of learning…
We propose a new mean-field game model with two states to study synchronization phenomena, and we provide a comprehensive characterization of stationary and dynamic equilibria along with their stability properties. The game undergoes a…