Related papers: A General Impossibility Theorem on Pareto Efficien…
We investigate the possibility of an incentive-compatible (IC, a.k.a. strategy-proof) mechanism for the classification of agents in a network according to their reviews of each other. In the $ \alpha $-classification problem we are…
A simple heuristic model, including the multiple exchanges between economic agents, is used to explain the mechanism of emerging and maintenance of social inequality in the market economy. The model allows calculating a density function of…
We study the trade-offs between strategyproofness and other desiderata, such as efficiency or fairness, that often arise in the design of random ordinal mechanisms. We use approximate strategyproofness to define manipulability, a measure to…
When agents with independent priors bid for a single item, Myerson's optimal auction maximizes expected revenue, whereas Vickrey's second-price auction optimizes social welfare. We address the natural question of trade-offs between the two…
We consider a population of Bayesian agents who share a common prior over some finite state space and each agent is exposed to some information about the state. We ask which distributions over empirical distributions of posteriors beliefs…
This paper studies preference aggregation under ambiguity when agents have incomplete preference relations due to imprecise beliefs. We introduce the "dual" of the Pareto principle, which respects unanimity among individuals, including…
We consider active learning under incentive compatibility constraints. The main application of our results is to economic experiments, in which a learner seeks to infer the parameters of a subject's preferences: for example their attitudes…
When allocating indivisible objects via lottery, planners often use ordinal mechanisms, which elicit agents' rankings of objects rather than their full preferences over lotteries. In such an ordinal informational environment, planners…
We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme (a.k.a. contract) so as to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action. We relax the assumption that the principal perfectly…
We study a mechanism design problem where a community of agents wishes to fund public projects via voluntary monetary contributions by the community members. This serves as a model for public expenditure without an exogenously available…
We consider a participatory budgeting problem in which each voter submits a proposal for how to divide a single divisible resource (such as money or time) among several possible alternatives (such as public projects or activities) and these…
In social choice theory with ordinal preferences, a voting method satisfies the axiom of positive involvement if adding to a preference profile a voter who ranks an alternative uniquely first cannot cause that alternative to go from winning…
We prove an existence result for the principal-agent problem with adverse selection under general assumptions on preferences and allocation spaces. Instead of assuming that the allocation space is finite-dimensional or compact, we consider…
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the ordinal preferences of individual voters over multiple alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. In order to study the axiomatic properties of SDSs, we lift preferences over…
We describe a Bayesian model for social learning of a random variable in which agents might observe each other over a directed network. The outcomes produced are compared to those from a model in which observations occur randomly over a…
The quality of consequences in a decision making problem under (severe) uncertainty must often be compared among different targets (goals, objectives) simultaneously. In addition, the evaluations of a consequence's performance under the…
We present a method for using standard techniques from satisfiability checking to automatically verify and discover theorems in an area of economic theory known as ranking sets of objects. The key question in this area, which has important…
In many prediction problems, the predictive model affects the distribution of the prediction target. This phenomenon is known as performativity and is often caused by the behavior of individuals with vested interests in the outcome of the…
In consumer theory, ranking available objects by means of preference relations yields the most common description of individual choices. However, preference-based models assume that individuals: (1) give their preferences only between pairs…
Let $(f,P)$ be an incentive compatible mechanism where $f$ is the social choice function and $P$ is the payment function. In many important settings, $f$ uniquely determines $P$ (up to a constant) and therefore a common approach is to focus…