Related papers: Robust Social Welfare Maximization via Information…
We consider linear-quadratic Gaussian (LQG) games in which players have quadratic payoffs that depend on the players' actions and an unknown payoff-relevant state, and signals on the state that follow a Gaussian distribution conditional on…
We study linear-quadratic games of incomplete information with Gaussian uncertainty, where each player's payoff depends on a privately observed type and a common state. The designer observes the state, elicits types, and sells action…
This paper addresses information design in a workhorse model of network games, where agents have linear best responses, the information designer maximizes a quadratic objective, and the payoff-relevant state follows a multivariate Gaussian…
We consider linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) network games in which agents have quadratic payoffs that depend on their individual and neighbors' actions, and an unknown payoff-relevant state. An information designer determines the fidelity…
We study information design in games where players choose from a continuum of actions and have continuously differentiable payoffs. We show that an information structure is optimal when the equilibrium it induces can also be implemented in…
This work considers a novel information design problem and studies how the craft of payoff-relevant environmental signals solely can influence the behaviors of intelligent agents. The agents' strategic interactions are captured by an…
There has been a recent surge of interest in the role of information in strategic interactions. Much of this work seeks to understand how the realized equilibrium of a game is influenced by uncertainty in the environment and the information…
We present a new model of incomplete information games without private information in which the players use a distributionally robust optimization approach to cope with the payoff uncertainty. With some specific restrictions, we show that…
The classical, complete-information two-player games assume that the problem data (in particular the payoff matrix) is known exactly by both players. In a now famous result, Nash has shown that any such game has an equilibrium in mixed…
We consider a routing game among non-atomic agents where link latency functions are conditional on an uncertain state of the network. The agents have the same prior belief about the state, but only a fixed fraction receive private route…
We study information design in multi-agent systems (MAS) with binary actions and strategic complementarities, where an external designer influences behavior only through signals. Agents play the smallest-equilibrium of the induced Bayesian…
We consider games in which players search for a hidden prize, and they have asymmetric information about the prize location. We study the social payoff in equilibria of these games. We present sufficient conditions for the existence of an…
In game theory, mechanism design is concerned with the design of incentives so that a desired outcome of the game can be achieved. In this paper, we explore the concept of equilibrium design, where incentives are designed to obtain a…
The paper proposes a natural measure space of zero-sum perfect information games with upper semicontinuous payoffs. Each game is specified by the game tree, and by the assignment of the active player and of the capacity to each node of the…
This work considers a novel information design problem and studies how the craft of payoff-relevant environmental signals solely can influence the behaviors of intelligent agents. The agents' strategic interactions are captured by a Markov…
In many engineered systems, agents make decisions under incomplete information, creating opportunities for a planner to influence decentralized behavior through signaling. We study how such signaling can be designed in parallel-network,…
We consider a problem of information structure design in team decision problems and team games. We propose simple, scalable greedy algorithms for adding a set of extra information links to optimize team performance and resilience to…
Most algorithmic studies on multi-agent information design so far have focused on the restricted situation with no inter-agent externalities; a few exceptions investigated truly strategic games such as zero-sum games and second-price…
This paper is concerned with a two-person zero-sum indefinite stochastic linear-quadratic Stackelberg differential game with asymmetric informational uncertainties, where both the leader and follower face different and unknown disturbances.…
This paper studies the problem of intervention design for steering the actions of noncooperative players in quadratic network games to the social optimum. The players choose their actions with the aim of maximizing their individual payoff…