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Related papers: Multi-block MEV

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We analyze maximal extractable value in multiple concurrent proposer blockchains, where multiple blocks become data available before their final execution order is determined. This concurrency breaks the single builder assumption of…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-11-18 Steven Landers , Benjamin Marsh

Block production on the Ethereum blockchain has adopted an auction-based mechanism known as Proposer--Builder Separation (PBS), where validators outsource block creation to builders competing in MEV--Boost auctions for Maximal Extractable…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-10-01 Fei Wu , Thomas Thiery , Stefanos Leonardos , Carmine Ventre

Maximal extractable value (MEV) in which block proposers unethically gain profits by manipulating the order in which transactions are included within a block, is a key challenge facing blockchains such as Ethereum today. Left unchecked, MEV…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2024-05-16 Yifan Mao , Mengya Zhang , Shaileshh Bojja Venkatakrishnan , Zhiqiang Lin

This study analyzes proposer-builder data and MEV-Boost payment data following the Ethereum merge in September 2022 to identify patterns of multi-block MEV. Our findings reveal fewer multi-slot sequences of builders than predicted by a…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-01-23 Pascal Stichler

The Ethereum block-building process has changed significantly since the emergence of Proposer-Builder Separation. Validators access blocks through a marketplace, where block builders bid for the right to construct the block and earn MEV…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2024-03-19 Fei Wu , Thomas Thiery , Stefanos Leonardos , Carmine Ventre

With the emergence of Miner Extractable Value (MEV), block construction markets on blockchains have evolved into a competitive arena. Following Ethereum's transition from Proof of Work (PoW) to Proof of Stake (PoS), the Proposer Builder…

Networking and Internet Architecture · Computer Science 2023-06-06 Anton Wahrstätter , Liyi Zhou , Kaihua Qin , Davor Svetinovic , Arthur Gervais

We study builder-driven MEV arbitrage on BNB Smart Chain (BSC). BSC's Proposer-Builder Separation (PBS) adopts a leaner design: only whitelisted builders can participate, blocks are produced at shorter intervals, and private order flow…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2026-05-01 Qin Wang , Ruiqiang Li , Guangsheng Yu , Vincent Gramoli , Shiping Chen

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) has emerged as a new frontier in the design of blockchain systems. In this paper, we propose making the MEV extraction rate as part of the protocol design space. Our aim is to leverage this parameter to…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2024-10-02 Pedro Braga , Georgios Chionas , Piotr Krysta , Stefanos Leonardos , Georgios Piliouras , Carmine Ventre

We provide an economic model of Execution Tickets and use it to study the ability of the Ethereum protocol to capture MEV from block construction. We demonstrate that Execution Tickets extract all MEV when all buyers are homogeneous, risk…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2024-08-22 Jonah Burian , Davide Crapis , Fahad Saleh

Blockchains offer strong security guarantees, but they cannot protect the ordering of transactions. Powerful players, such as miners, sequencers, and sophisticated bots, can reap significant profits by selectively including, excluding, or…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2023-10-24 Sen Yang , Fan Zhang , Ken Huang , Xi Chen , Youwei Yang , Feng Zhu

Currently, over 90% of Ethereum blocks are built using MEV-Boost, an auction that allows validators to sell their block-building power to builders who compete in an open English auction in each slot. Shortly after the merge, when MEV-Boost…

Theoretical Economics · Economics 2023-11-16 Mallesh Pai , Max Resnick

The MEV-Boost block auction contributes approximately 90% of all Ethereum blocks. Between October 2023 and March 2024, only three builders produced 80% of them, highlighting the concentration of power within the block builder market. To…

Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science · Computer Science 2024-07-22 Burak Öz , Danning Sui , Thomas Thiery , Florian Matthes

Ethereum, as a representative of Web3, adopts a novel framework called Proposer Builder Separation (PBS) to prevent the centralization of block profits in the hands of institutional Ethereum stakers. Introducing builders to generate blocks…

Computational Engineering, Finance, and Science · Computer Science 2024-11-14 Shuzheng Wang , Yue Huang , Wenqin Zhang , Yuming Huang , Xuechao Wang , Jing Tang

In blockchain systems operating under the Proof-of-Stake (PoS) consensus mechanism, fairness in transaction processing is essential to preserving decentralization and maintaining user trust. However, with the emergence of Maximal…

Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing · Computer Science 2026-01-21 Yitian Wang , Yebo Feng , Yingjiu Li , Jiahua Xu

In this article, we develop an interdisciplinary analysis of MEV which desires to merge the gap that exists between technical and legal research supporting policymakers in their regulatory decisions concerning blockchains, DeFi and…

Computers and Society · Computer Science 2023-05-08 Simona Ramos , Joshua Ellul

Blockchains have popularized automated market makers (AMMs). An AMM exchange is an application running on a blockchain which maintains a pool of crypto-assets and automatically trades assets with users governed by some pricing function that…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2025-09-16 T-H. Hubert Chan , Ke Wu , Elaine Shi

Traditional single-proposer blockchains suffer from miner extractable value (MEV), where validators exploit their serial monopoly on transaction inclusion and ordering to extract rents from users. While there have been many developments at…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2025-09-30 Pranav Garimidi , Joachim Neu , Max Resnick

In blockchain networks, the strategic ordering of transactions within blocks has emerged as a significant source of profit extraction, known as Maximal Extractable Value (MEV). The transition from spam-based Priority Gas Auctions to…

On high-throughput, low-fee blockchains, a qualitatively new form of maximal extractable value (MEV) has emerged: searchers submit large volumes of speculative transactions, whose profitability is resolved only at execution time. We refer…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2026-04-02 Wenhao Wang , Aditya Saraf , Lioba Heimbach , Kushal Babel , Fan Zhang

Initially introduced to Ethereum via Flashbots' MEV-boost, Proposer-Builder Separation allows proposers to auction off blockspace to a market of transaction orderers, known as builders. PBS is currently available to validators through the…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2025-06-24 Maxwell Koegler
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