Related papers: A Redistribution Framework for Diffusion Auctions

We consider reallocation problems in settings where the initial endowment of each agent consists of a subset of the resources. The private information of the players is their value for every possible subset of the resources. The goal is to…

The purpose of Inventory Pricing is to bid the right prices to online ad opportunities, which is crucial for a Demand-Side Platform (DSP) to win advertising auctions in Real-Time Bidding (RTB). In the planning stage, advertisers need the…

Although recommenders can ship items to users automatically based on the users' preferences, they often cause unfairness to groups or individuals. For instance, when users can be divided into two groups according to a sensitive social…

Diffusion models have shown remarkable abilities in generating realistic and high-quality images from text prompts. However, a trained model remains largely black-box; little do we know about the roles of its components in exhibiting a…

We study multidimensional mechanism design in a common scenario where players have private information about their willingness to pay and their ability to pay. We provide a complete characterization of dominant-strategy incentive-compatible…

The difference set of an outcome in an auction is the set of types that the auction mechanism maps to the outcome. We give a complete characterization of the geometry of the difference sets that can appear for a dominant strategy incentive…

Diffusion models have shown their effectiveness in generation tasks by well-approximating the underlying probability distribution. However, diffusion models are known to suffer from an amplified inherent bias from the training data in terms…

Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take. Since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes, they have been widely used…

We study a sequential mechanism design problem in which a principal seeks to elicit truthful reports from multiple rational agents while starting with no prior knowledge of agents' beliefs. We introduce Distributionally Robust Adaptive…

We consider a mechanism design setting with a single item and a single buyer who is uncertain about the value of the item. Both the buyer and the seller have a common model for the buyer's value, but the buyer discovers her true value only…

We study online auction settings in which agents arrive and depart dynamically in a random (secretary) order, and each agent's private type consists of the agent's arrival and departure times, value and budget. We consider multi-unit…

As diffusion models are deployed in real-world settings, and their performance is driven by training data, appraising the contribution of data contributors is crucial to creating incentives for sharing quality data and to implementing…

We investigate revenue guarantees for auction mechanisms in a model where a distribution is specified for each bidder, but only some of the distributions are correct. The subset of bidders whose distribution is correctly specified…

Diffusion, a fundamental internal mechanism emerging in many physical processes, describes the interaction among different objects. In many learning tasks with limited training samples, the diffusion connects the labeled and unlabeled data…

Generative AI has redefined artificial intelligence, enabling the creation of innovative content and customized solutions that drive business practices into a new era of efficiency and creativity. In this paper, we focus on diffusion…

Diffusion-based learning has settled as a rising paradigm in generative recommendation, outperforming traditional approaches built upon variational autoencoders and generative adversarial networks. Despite their effectiveness, concerns have…

Exchange markets are a significant type of market economy, in which each agent holds a budget and certain (divisible) resources available for trading. Most research on equilibrium in exchange economies is based on an environment of…

I consider a mechanism design problem of selling multiple goods to multiple bidders when the designer has minimal amount of information. I assume that the designer only knows the upper bounds of bidders' values for each good and has no…

Resource distribution is a fundamental problem in economic and policy design, particularly when demand and supply are not naturally aligned. Without regulation, wealthier individuals may monopolize this resource, leaving the needs of others…

We design a framework for truthful double multi-channel spectrum auctions where each seller (or buyer) can sell (or buy) multiple spectrum channels based on their individual needs. Open, market-based spectrum trading motivates existing…