Related papers: Learning not to Regret
We suggest a general method for inferring players' values from their actions in repeated games. The method extends and improves upon the recent suggestion of (Nekipelov et al., EC 2015) and is based on the assumption that players are more…
In repeated games, strategies are often evaluated by their ability to guarantee the performance of the single best action that is selected in hindsight, a property referred to as \emph{Hannan consistency}, or \emph{no-regret}. However, the…
We study a general class of repeated auctions, such as the ones found in electricity markets, as multi-agent games between the bidders. In such a repeated setting, bidders can adapt their strategies online based on the data observed in the…
With the constraint of a no regret follower, will the players in a two-player Stackelberg game still reach Stackelberg equilibrium? We first show when the follower strategy is either reward-average or transform-reward-average, the two…
In recent years, empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA) has emerged as a powerful tool for analyzing games in which an exact specification of the utilities is unavailable. Instead, EGTA assumes access to an oracle, i.e., a simulator,…
Prediction is a well-studied machine learning task, and prediction algorithms are core ingredients in online products and services. Despite their centrality in the competition between online companies who offer prediction-based products,…
We consider the problem of online fair division of indivisible goods to players when there are a finite number of types of goods and player values are drawn from distributions with unknown means. Our goal is to maximize social welfare…
Simple adaptive procedures that converge to correlated equilibria are known to exist for normal form games (Hart and Mas-Colell 2000), but no such analogue exists for extensive-form games. Leveraging inspiration from Zinkevich et al.…
Unsupervised skill discovery aims to learn diverse and distinguishable behaviors in open-ended reinforcement learning. For existing methods, they focus on improving diversity through pure exploration, mutual information optimization, and…
We study regret minimization in a stochastic multi-armed bandit setting and establish a fundamental trade-off between the regret suffered under an algorithm, and its statistical robustness. Considering broad classes of underlying arms'…
The regret matching algorithm proposed by Sergiu Hart is one of the most powerful iterative methods in finding correlated equilibrium. However, it is possibly not efficient enough, especially in large scale problems. We first rewrite the…
Consider N cooperative but non-communicating players where each plays one out of M arms for T turns. Players have different utilities for each arm, representable as an NxM matrix. These utilities are unknown to the players. In each turn…
In this work, we study potential games and Markov potential games under stochastic cost and bandit feedback. We propose a variant of the Frank-Wolfe algorithm with sufficient exploration and recursive gradient estimation, which provably…
Partial monitoring is a general model for sequential learning with limited feedback formalized as a game between two players. In this game, the learner chooses an action and at the same time the opponent chooses an outcome, then the learner…
A central capability of intelligent systems is the ability to continuously build upon previous experiences to speed up and enhance learning of new tasks. Two distinct research paradigms have studied this question. Meta-learning views this…
We develop a novel and generic algorithm for the adversarial multi-armed bandit problem (or more generally the combinatorial semi-bandit problem). When instantiated differently, our algorithm achieves various new data-dependent regret…
We study last-iterate convergence properties of algorithms for solving two-player zero-sum games based on Regret Matching$^+$ (RM$^+$). Despite their widespread use for solving real games, virtually nothing is known about their last-iterate…
Motivated by learning of correlated equilibria in non-cooperative games, we perform a large deviations analysis of a regret minimizing stochastic approximation algorithm. The regret minimization algorithm we consider comprises multiple…
In the convex optimization approach to online regret minimization, many methods have been developed to guarantee a $O(\sqrt{T})$ bound on regret for subdifferentiable convex loss functions with bounded subgradients, by using a reduction to…
Under the uncoupled learning setup, the last-iterate convergence guarantee towards Nash equilibrium is shown to be impossible in many games. This work studies the last-iterate convergence guarantee in general games toward rationalizability,…