Related papers: Bicriteria Multidimensional Mechanism Design with …
Data-driven predictions are often perceived as inaccurate in hindsight due to behavioral responses. In this study, we explore the role of interface design choices in shaping individuals' decision-making processes in response to predictions…
Ensuring that AI agents behave safely and beneficially when interacting with other parties has emerged as one of the central challenges of modern AI safety. While mechanism design, as the theory of designing rules to align individual and…
We consider the classical mathematical economics problem of {\em Bayesian optimal mechanism design} where a principal aims to optimize expected revenue when allocating resources to self-interested agents with preferences drawn from a known…
Stochastic multi-agent multi-armed bandits typically assume that the rewards from each arm follow a fixed distribution, regardless of which agent pulls the arm. However, in many real-world settings, rewards can depend on the sensitivity of…
How to optimally persuade an agent who has a private type? When elicitation is feasible, this amounts to a fairly standard principal-agent-style mechanism design problem, where the persuader employs a mechanism to first elicit the agent's…
We study information design settings where the designer controls information about a state, and there are multiple agents interacting in a game who are privately informed about their types. Each agent's utility depends on all agents' types…
In this work we introduce an alternative model for the design and analysis of strategyproof mechanisms that is motivated by the recent surge of work in "learning-augmented algorithms". Aiming to complement the traditional approach in…
Mechanism design is now a standard tool in computer science for aligning the incentives of self-interested agents with the objectives of a system designer. There is, however, a fundamental disconnect between the traditional application…
We study allocation mechanisms that utilize costly signaling as a screening tool. A social planner aims to maximize social welfare, defined as the weighted sum of agents' utilities, while implementing a specific allocation rule. Within a…
In an emergency situation, the actors need an assistance allowing them to react swiftly and efficiently. In this prospect, we present in this paper a decision support system that aims to prepare actors in a crisis situation thanks to a…
Information frictions can harm the welfare of participants in two-sided matching markets. Consider a centralized admission, where colleges cannot observe students' preparedness for success in a particular major or degree program. Colleges…
Existing auction mechanisms are vulnerable to bidder collusion, which substantially degrades revenue and non-colluder welfare. To design truthful mechanisms resilient to collusion, we introduce a novel approach that leverages a machine…
The buying and selling of information is taking place at a scale unprecedented in the history of commerce, thanks to the formation of online marketplaces for user data. Data providing agencies sell user information to advertisers to allow…
Agent-Based Models (ABM) are computational scenario-generators, which can be used to predict the possible future outcomes of the complex system they represent. To better understand the robustness of these predictions, it is necessary to…
We design profit-maximizing mechanisms to sell an excludable and non-rival good with positive and/or negative network effects. Buyers have heterogeneous private values that depend on how many others also consume the good. In optimum, an…
With the adoption of autonomous vehicles on our roads, we will witness a mixed-autonomy environment where autonomous and human-driven vehicles must learn to co-exist by sharing the same road infrastructure. To attain socially-desirable…
We study Bayesian automated mechanism design in unstructured dynamic environments, where a principal repeatedly interacts with an agent, and takes actions based on the strategic agent's report of the current state of the world. Both the…
The model of a side information "vending machine" (VM) accounts for scenarios in which the measurement of side information sequences can be controlled via the selection of cost-constrained actions. In this paper, the three-node cascade…
Good economic mechanisms depend on the preferences of participants in the mechanism. For example, the revenue-optimal auction for selling an item is parameterized by a reserve price, and the appropriate reserve price depends on how much the…
The study of mechanisms for multi-sided markets has received an increasingly growing attention from the research community, and is motivated by the numerous examples of such markets on the web and in electronic commerce. Many of these…