Related papers: Implicit Poisoning Attacks in Two-Agent Reinforcem…
We study a security threat to reinforcement learning where an attacker poisons the learning environment to force the agent into executing a target policy chosen by the attacker. As a victim, we consider RL agents whose objective is to find…
We study a security threat to reinforcement learning where an attacker poisons the learning environment to force the agent into executing a target policy chosen by the attacker. As a victim, we consider RL agents whose objective is to find…
We study defense strategies against reward poisoning attacks in reinforcement learning. As a threat model, we consider attacks that minimally alter rewards to make the attacker's target policy uniquely optimal under the poisoned rewards,…
We study a security threat to batch reinforcement learning and control where the attacker aims to poison the learned policy. The victim is a reinforcement learner / controller which first estimates the dynamics and the rewards from a batch…
In offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), agents estimate policies from a given dataset. We study reward-poisoning attacks in this setting where an exogenous attacker modifies the rewards in the dataset before the agents see the…
We study reward poisoning attacks in reinforcement learning (RL), where an adversary manipulates rewards within constrained budgets to force the target RL agent to adopt a policy that aligns with the attacker's objectives. Prior works on…
To understand the security threats to reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms, this paper studies poisoning attacks to manipulate \emph{any} order-optimal learning algorithm towards a targeted policy in episodic RL and examines the potential…
This paper proposes an online environment poisoning algorithm tailored for reinforcement learning agents operating in a black-box setting, where an adversary deliberately manipulates training data to lead the agent toward a mischievous…
We study reward poisoning attacks on online deep reinforcement learning (DRL), where the attacker is oblivious to the learning algorithm used by the agent and the dynamics of the environment. We demonstrate the intrinsic vulnerability of…
Research in adversarial machine learning has shown how the performance of machine learning models can be seriously compromised by injecting even a small fraction of poisoning points into the training data. While the effects on model…
Due to the broad range of applications of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), understanding the effects of adversarial attacks against MARL model is essential for the safe applications of this model. Motivated by this, we investigate…
In a poisoning attack, an adversary with control over a small fraction of the training data attempts to select that data in a way that induces a corrupted model that misbehaves in favor of the adversary. We consider poisoning attacks…
We study reward design strategies for incentivizing a reinforcement learning agent to adopt a policy from a set of admissible policies. The goal of the reward designer is to modify the underlying reward function cost-efficiently while…
Finding optimal adversarial attack strategies is an important topic in reinforcement learning and the Markov decision process. Previous studies usually assume one all-knowing coordinator (attacker) for whom attacking different recipient…
Poisoning attacks on machine learning systems compromise the model performance by deliberately injecting malicious samples in the training dataset to influence the training process. Prior works focus on either availability attacks (i.e.,…
Machine learning algorithms are vulnerable to poisoning attacks: An adversary can inject malicious points in the training dataset to influence the learning process and degrade the algorithm's performance. Optimal poisoning attacks have…
Control policies, trained using the Deep Reinforcement Learning, have been recently shown to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks introducing even very small perturbations to the policy input. The attacks proposed so far have been designed…
Data poisoning for reinforcement learning has historically focused on general performance degradation, and targeted attacks have been successful via perturbations that involve control of the victim's policy and rewards. We introduce an…
We study the corruption-robustness of in-context reinforcement learning (ICRL), focusing on the Decision-Pretrained Transformer (DPT, Lee et al., 2023). To address the challenge of reward poisoning attacks targeting the DPT, we propose a…
We consider availability data poisoning attacks, where an adversary aims to degrade the overall test accuracy of a machine learning model by crafting small perturbations to its training data. Existing poisoning strategies can achieve the…