Related papers: On price-induced minmax matchings
Many scenarios where agents with restrictions compete for resources can be cast as maximum matching problems on bipartite graphs. Our focus is on resource allocation problems where agents may have restrictions that make them incompatible…
We consider a package assignment problem with multiple units of indivisible items. The seller can specify preferences over partitions of their supply between buyers as packaging costs. We propose incremental costs together with a graph that…
Online Resource Allocation addresses the problem of efficiently allocating limited resources to buyers with incomplete knowledge of future requests. In our setting, buyers arrive sequentially requesting a set of items, each with a value…
Classical optimal auction theory assumes that bids reach the seller directly. We study how this picture changes when a revenue-maximizing intermediary controls access to the seller's auction. Motivated by blockchain auctions, online…
In the envy-free perfect matching problem, $n$ items with unit supply are available to be sold to $n$ buyers with unit demand. The objective is to find allocation and prices such that both seller's revenue and buyers' surpluses are…
We study the mechanism design problem of selling $k$ items to unit-demand buyers with private valuations for the items. A buyer either participates directly in the auction or is represented by an intermediary, who represents a subset of…
Simultaneous ascending auctions present agents with the exposure problem: bidding to acquire a bundle risks the possibility of obtaining an undesired subset of the goods. Auction theory provides little guidance for dealing with this…
We consider Stackelberg pricing games, which are also known as bilevel pricing problems, or combinatorial price-setting problems. This family of problems consists of games between two players: the leader and the follower. There is a market…
In online combinatorial allocations/auctions, n bidders sequentially arrive, each with a combinatorial valuation (such as submodular/XOS) over subsets of m indivisible items. The aim is to immediately allocate a subset of the remaining…
In a combinatorial auction with item bidding, agents participate in multiple single-item second-price auctions at once. As some items might be substitutes, agents need to strategize in order to maximize their utilities. A number of results…
We study buyer-optimal procurement mechanisms when quality is contractible. When some costs are borne by every participant of a procurement auction regardless of winning, the classic analysis should be amended. We show that an optimal…
We study generalizations of online bipartite matching in which each arriving vertex (customer) views a ranked list of offline vertices (products) and matches to (purchases) the first one they deem acceptable. The number of products that the…
In the online 2-bounded auction problem, we have a collection of items represented as nodes in a graph and bundles of size two represented by edges. Agents are presented sequentially, each with a random weight function over the bundles. The…
We study a class of manipulations in combinatorial auctions where bidders fundamentally misrepresent what goods they are interested in. Prior work has largely assumed that bidders only submit bids on their bundles of interest, which we call…
Consider a network design application where we wish to lay down a minimum-cost spanning tree in a given graph; however, we only have stochastic information about the edge costs. To learn the precise cost of any edge, we have to conduct a…
This paper is concerned with a pairs trading rule. The idea is to monitor two historically correlated securities. When divergence is underway, i.e., one stock moves up while the other moves down, a pairs trade is entered which consists of a…
We analyze the problem of how to optimally bid for ad spaces in online ad auctions. For this we consider the general case of multiple ad campaigns with overlapping targeting criteria. In our analysis we first characterize the structure of…
We study approximation algorithms for graph pricing with vertex capacities yet without the traditional envy-free constraint. Specifically, we have a set of items $V$ and a set of customers $X$ where each customer $i \in X$ has a budget…
The Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree Game is a two-level combinatorial pricing problem played on a graph representing a network. Its edges are colored either red or blue, and the red edges have a given fixed cost, representing the…
We use valid inequalities (cuts) of the binary integer program for winner determination in a combinatorial auction (CA) as "artificial items" that can be interpreted intuitively and priced to generate Artificial Walrasian Equilibria. We…