Related papers: IRS: An Incentive-compatible Reward Scheme for Alg…
Cryptographic Self-Selection is a subroutine used to select a leader for modern proof-of-stake consensus protocols, such as Algorand. In cryptographic self-selection, each round $r$ has a seed $Q_r$. In round $r$, each account owner is…
Smart contracts have enabled blockchain systems to evolve from simple cryptocurrency platforms, such as Bitcoin, to general transactional systems, such as Ethereum. Catering for emerging business requirements, a new architecture called…
Many large decentralized systems rely on information propagation to ensure their proper function. We examine a common scenario in which only participants that are aware of the information can compete for some reward, and thus informed…
TrueBit is a protocol that uses interactive verification to allow a resource-constrained computation environment like a blockchain to perform much larger computations than usual in a trusted way. As long as a single honest participant is…
This paper proposes a method of emulation of \verb|OP_RAND| opcode on Bitcoin through a trustless interactive game between transaction counterparties. The game result is probabilistic and doesn't allow any party to cheat, increasing their…
Reward modeling has emerged as a promising approach for the scalable alignment of language models. However, contemporary reward models (RMs) often lack robustness, awarding high rewards to low-quality, out-of-distribution (OOD) samples.…
The consensus protocol is a critical component of distributed ledgers and blockchains. Achieving consensus over a decentralized network poses challenges to transaction finality and performance. Currently, the highest-performing consensus…
It has been known for some time that the Nakamoto consensus as implemented in the Bitcoin protocol is not totally aligned with the individual interests of the participants. More precisely, it has been shown that block withholding mining…
This paper introduces a game-theoretic model tailored for reward distribution on crowd-sourced computing platforms. It explores a repeated game framework where miners, as computation providers, decide their computation power contribution in…
With upcoming blockchain infrastructures, world-spanning Byzantine consensus is getting practical and necessary. In geographically distributed systems, the pace at which consensus is achieved is limited by the heterogenous latencies of…
Incentive mechanisms are central to the functionality of permissionless blockchains: they incentivize participants to run and secure the underlying consensus protocol. Designing incentive-compatible incentive mechanisms is notoriously…
Traditionally, peer-to-peer systems have relied on altruism and reciprocity. Although incentive-based models have gained prominence in new-generation peer-to-peer systems, it is essential to recognize the continued importance of cooperative…
Learning a reward function from human preferences is challenging as it typically requires having a high-fidelity simulator or using expensive and potentially unsafe actual physical rollouts in the environment. However, in many tasks the…
With the development of decentralized consensus protocols, permissionless blockchains have been envisioned as a promising enabler for the general-purpose transaction-driven, autonomous systems. However, most of the prevalent blockchain…
As an emerging decentralized secure data management platform, blockchain has gained much popularity recently. To maintain a canonical state of blockchain data record, proof-of-work based consensus protocols provide the nodes, referred to as…
Nowadays, rating systems play a crucial role in the attraction of customers for different services. However, as it is difficult to detect a fake rating, attackers can potentially impact the rating's aggregated score unfairly. This malicious…
Play-to-earn is one of the prospective categories of decentralized applications. The play-to-earn projects combine blockchain technology with entertaining games and finance, attracting various participants. While huge amounts of capital…
Blockchain systems need to solve consensus despite the presence of rational users and failures. The notion of $(k,t)$-robustness has shown instrumental to list problems that cannot be solved if $k$ players are rational and $t$ players are…
Our work focuses on the design of a scalable permissionless blockchain in the proof-of-stake setting. In particular, we use a distributed hash table as a building block to set up randomized shards, and then leverage the sharded architecture…
We provide a practical translation from the Dynamic Condition Response (DCR) process modelling language to the Transaction Execution Approval Language (TEAL) used by the Algorand blockchain. Compared to earlier implementations of business…