Related papers: The Swiss Gambit
In this paper we bring a novel approach to the theory of tournament rankings. We combine two different theories that are widely used to establish rankings of populations after a given tournament. First, we use the statistical approach of…
Experiments on the ultimatum game have revealed that humans are remarkably fond of fair play. When asked to share an amount of money, unfair offers are rare and their acceptance rate small. While empathy and spatiality may lead to the…
In repeated-game applications where both the collusive and non-collusive outcomes can be supported as equilibria, researchers must resolve underlying selection questions if theory will be used to understand counterfactual policies. One…
Who gains and who loses from a manipulable school-choice mechanism? Studying the outcomes of sincere and sophisticated students under the manipulable Boston Mechanism as compared with the strategy-proof Deferred Acceptance, we provide…
This paper presents a data-driven statistical framework to quantify the role of skill in games, addressing the long-standing question of whether success in a game is predominantly driven by skill or chance. We analyze player level data from…
Infinitely repeated games can support cooperative outcomes that are not equilibria in the one-shot game. The idea is to make sure that any gains from deviating will be offset by retaliation in future rounds. However, this model of…
The paper presents a hierarchical Bayesian model for simultaneous inference of tournament graphs and informant error. From multiple informant reports or measurement instrument outputs, the model estimates the structure of a criterion (i.e.,…
In imperfect information games (e.g. Bridge, Skat, Poker), one of the fundamental considerations is to infer the missing information while at the same time avoiding the disclosure of private information. Disregarding the issue of protecting…
A hockey player's plus-minus measures the difference between goals scored by and against that player's team while the player was on the ice. This measures only a marginal effect, failing to account for the influence of the others he is…
We study a setting where tickets for an experience are allocated by lottery. Each agent belongs to a group, and a group is successful if and only if its members receive enough tickets for everyone. A lottery is efficient if it maximizes the…
Gerber and Li in \cite{GeLi} formulated, using a Markov chain embedding, a system of equations that describes relations between generating functions of waiting time distributions for occurrences of patterns in a sequence of independent…
Motivated by cognitive radios, stochastic multi-player multi-armed bandits gained a lot of interest recently. In this class of problems, several players simultaneously pull arms and encounter a collision - with 0 reward - if some of them…
In the multiarmed bandit problem a gambler chooses an arm of a slot machine to pull considering a tradeoff between exploration and exploitation. We study the stochastic bandit problem where each arm has a reward distribution supported in a…
In repeated games, players choose actions concurrently at each step. We consider a parameterized setting of repeated games in which the players form a population of an arbitrary size. Their utility functions encode a reachability objective.…
We consider two-player stochastic games played on a finite graph for infinitely many rounds. Stochastic games generalize both Markov decision processes (MDP) by adding an adversary player, and two-player deterministic games by adding…
Two-player stochastic games are games with two 2 players and a randomised entity called "nature". A natural question to ask in this framework is the existence of strategies that ensure that an event happens with probability 1 (almost-sure…
The transitivity of preferences is one of the basic assumptions used in the theory of games and decisions. It is often equated with rationality of choice and is considered useful in building rankings. Intransitive preferences are considered…
A $p$-beauty contest is a wide class of games of guessing the most popular strategy among other players. In particular, guessing a fraction of a mean of numbers chosen by all players is a classic behavioral experiment designed to test…
It is noted that some unusual moves against a strong chess program greatly weaken its ability to see the serious targets of the game, and its whole level of play... It is suggested to create programs with different weaknesses in order to…
The Lipschitz constant of a finite normal-form game is the maximal change in some player's payoff when a single opponent changes his strategy. We prove that games with small Lipschitz constant admit pure {\epsilon}-equilibria, and pinpoint…