Related papers: Nash equilibrium selection by eigenvalue control

To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…

Prediction is a well-studied machine learning task, and prediction algorithms are core ingredients in online products and services. Despite their centrality in the competition between online companies who offer prediction-based products,…

We study the problem of stochastic stability for evolutionary dynamics under the logit choice rule. We consider general classes of coordination games, symmetric or asymmetric, with an arbitrary number of strategies, which satisfies the…

Precise description of population game dynamics introduced by revision protocols - an economic model describing the agent's propensity to switch to a better-performing strategy - is of importance in economics and social sciences in general.…

In this paper we establish a new connection between a class of 2-player nonzero-sum games of optimal stopping and certain $2$-player nonzero-sum games of singular control. We show that whenever a Nash equilibrium in the game of stopping is…

We consider quadratic, nonmonotone generalized Nash equilibrium problems with symmetric interactions among the agents. Albeit this class of games is known to admit a potential function, its formal expression can be unavailable in several…

In this paper, the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium of a multi-player game is considered. The players are only aware of their own cost functions as well as the action space of all players. We develop a relatively fast algorithm within…

Nash equilibria provide a principled framework for modeling interactions in multi-agent decision-making and control. However, many equilibrium-seeking methods implicitly assume that each agent has access to the other agents' objectives and…

In this paper, we consider the problem of wireless power control in an interference channel where transmitters aim to maximize their own benefit. When the individual payoff or utility function is derived from the transmission efficiency and…

This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with merely monotone and restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method…

We discuss stochastic dynamics of finite populations of individuals playing games. We review recent results concerning the dependence of the long-run behavior of such systems on the number of players and the noise level. In the case of…

In stochastic dynamical systems, different concepts of stability can be obtained in different limits. A particularly interesting example is evolutionary game theory, which is traditionally based on infinite populations, where strict Nash…

Consider a 2-player normal-form game repeated over time. We introduce an adaptive learning procedure, where the players only observe their own realized payoff at each stage. We assume that agents do not know their own payoff function, and…

Large scale systems are forecasted to greatly impact our future lives thanks to their wide ranging applications including cooperative robotics, mobility on demand, resource allocation, supply chain management. While technological…

We study the evolutionary stability of Nash equilibria (NE) in a symmetric quantum game played by the recently proposed scheme of applying `identity' and `Pauli spin flip' operators on the initial state with classical probabilities. We show…

We consider a scheduling game on parallel related machines, in which jobs try to minimize their completion time by choosing a machine to be processed on. Each machine uses an individual priority list to decide on the order according to…

We consider a class of continuous-time dynamic games involving a large number of players. Each player selects actions from a finite set and evolves through a finite set of states. State transitions occur stochastically and depend on the…

Consider a strongly monotone game where the players' utility functions include a reward function and a linear term for each dimension, with coefficients that are controlled by the manager. Gradient play converges to a unique Nash…

We introduce a simple stochastic dynamics for game theory. It assumes ``local'' rationality in the sense that any player climbs the gradient of his utility function in the presence of a stochastic force which represents deviation from…

We introduce and study incentive equilibria for multi-player meanpayoff games. Incentive equilibria generalise well-studied solution concepts such as Nash equilibria and leader equilibria (also known as Stackelberg equilibria). Recall that…