Related papers: Robust Pseudo-Markets for Reusable Public Resource…
We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods among agents with identical, additive valuations but individual budget constraints. Here, the indivisible goods--each with a specific size and value--need to be allocated such that the…
We consider the task of assigning indivisible goods to a set of agents in a fair manner. Our notion of fairness is Nash social welfare, i.e., the goal is to maximize the geometric mean of the utilities of the agents. Each good comes in…
We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible items to agents that have arbitrary entitlements to the items. Every agent $i$ has a valuation function $v_i$ and an entitlement $b_i$, where entitlements sum up to~1. Which…
A simple mechanism for allocating indivisible resources is sequential allocation in which agents take turns to pick items. We focus on possible and necessary allocation problems, checking whether allocations of a given form occur in some or…
We study the linear contextual bandit problem where an agent has to select one candidate from a pool and each candidate belongs to a sensitive group. In this setting, candidates' rewards may not be directly comparable between groups, for…
Fairly dividing a set of indivisible resources to a set of agents is of utmost importance in some applications. However, after an allocation has been implemented the preferences of agents might change and envy might arise. We study the…
This paper concerns the mechanism design for online resource allocation in a strategic setting. In this setting, a single supplier allocates capacity-limited resources to requests that arrive in a sequential and arbitrary manner. Each…
We study a fair resource scheduling problem, where a set of interval jobs are to be allocated to heterogeneous machines controlled by agents. Each job is associated with release time, deadline, and processing time such that it can be…
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of $m$ goods among $n$ agents in the asymptotic setting, where each item's value for each agent is drawn from an underlying joint distribution. Prior works have shown that if this distribution…
We investigate the power of randomness in the context of a fundamental Bayesian optimal mechanism design problem--a single seller aims to maximize expected revenue by allocating multiple kinds of resources to "unit-demand" agents with…
We study a problem where a group of agents has to decide how a joint reward should be shared among them. We focus on settings where the share that each agent receives depends on the subjective opinions of its peers concerning that agent's…
The problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items is a well-known challenge in the field of (computational) social choice. In this scenario, there is a fundamental incompatibility between notions of fairness (such as envy-freeness…
We study the consideration of fairness in redundant assignment for multi-agent task allocation. It has recently been shown that redundant assignment of agents to tasks provides robustness to uncertainty in task performance. However, the…
We consider item allocation to individual agents who have additive valuations, in settings in which there are protected groups, and the allocation needs to give each protected group its "fair" share of the total welfare. Informally, within…
In this paper, we present a novel approach for robust optimal resource allocation with joint carrier aggregation to allocate multiple carriers resources optimally among users with elastic and inelastic traffic in cellular networks. We use…
In practice, most auction mechanisms are not strategy-proof, so equilibrium analysis is required to predict bidding behavior. In many auctions, though, an exact equilibrium is not known and one would like to understand whether -- manually…
The strategic selection of resources by selfish agents is a classic research direction, with Resource Selection Games and Congestion Games as prominent examples. In these games, agents select available resources and their utility then…
We consider the problem of online allocation (matching and assortments) of reusable resources where customers arrive sequentially in an adversarial fashion and allocated resources are used or rented for a stochastic duration that is drawn…
A principal has $m$ identical objects to allocate among a group of $n$ agents. Objects are desirable and the principal's value of assigning an object to an agent is the agent's private information. The principal can verify up to $k$ agents,…
We develop a method using parameterized linear equations to define trading mechanisms in market design models. Our method adeptly addresses challenges arising from factors such as complex endowments or coarse priorities, while offering…