Related papers: Variational Reformulation of Generalized Nash Equi…
Any individual's preference represents his choice in the set of available options. It is said to be complete if the person can compare any pair of available options. We aim to initiate the notion of projected solutions for the generalized…
It is known that the generalized Nash equilibrium problem can be reformulated as a quasivariational inequality. Our aim in this work is to introduce a variational approach to study the existence of solutions for generalized ordinal Nash…
Games with incomplete preferences are an important model for studying rational decision-making in scenarios where players face incomplete information about their preferences and must contend with incomparable outcomes. We study the problem…
We study generalized games defined over Banach spaces using variational analysis. To reformulate generalized games as quasi-variational inequality problems, we will first form a suitable principal operator and study some significant…
Nash equilibrium serves as a fundamental mathematical tool in economics and game theory. However, it classically assumes knowledge of player utilities, whereas economics generally regards preferences as more fundamental. To leverage…
We study noncooperative games, in which each player's objective is composed of a sequence of ordered- and potentially conflicting-preferences. Problems of this type naturally model a wide variety of scenarios: for example, drivers at a busy…
Generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) is a solution concept for complete information games, in which each player's objective function and feasible region depend on other players' actions. While numerical methods for finding GNE when players…
Wide machine learning tasks can be formulated as non-convex multi-player games, where Nash equilibrium (NE) is an acceptable solution to all players, since no one can benefit from changing its strategy unilaterally. Attributed to the…
Variational inequality problems allow for capturing an expansive class of problems, including convex optimization problems, convex Nash games and economic equilibrium problems, amongst others. Yet in most practical settings, such problems…
Nash equilibria and Pareto optimality are two distinct concepts when dealing with multiple criteria. It is well known that the two concepts do not coincide. However, in this work we show that it is possible to characterize the set of all…
In this paper, the problem of finding a generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) of a networked game is studied. Players are only able to choose their decisions from a feasible action set. The feasible set is considered to be a private linear…
Computing an equilibrium in congestion games can be challenging when the number of players is large. Yet, it is a problem to be addressed in practice, for instance to forecast the state of the system and be able to control it. In this work,…
We consider generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEPs) with linear coupling constraints affected by both local (i.e., agent-wise) and global (i.e., shared resources) disturbances taking values in polyhedral uncertainty sets. By making…
We study pure-strategy Nash equilibria in multi-player concurrent deterministic games, for a variety of preference relations. We provide a novel construction, called the suspect game, which transforms a multi-player concurrent game into a…
The equilibrium selection problem in the variational Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problem (v-GNEP) has been reported as an optimization problem defined over the solution set of v-GNEP, called in this paper the lower-level v-GNEP. However,…
This paper introduces risk-revising players to a class of games with incomplete information. These players enter the game with ex ante risk preferences represented by coherent risk measures and develop time-consistent interim revisions of…
We deal with the generalized Nash game proposed by Rosen, which is a game with strategy sets that are coupled across players through a shared constraint. A reduction to a classical game is shown, and as a consequence, Rosen's result can be…
We study the computational complexity of Nash equilibria in concurrent games with limit-average objectives. In particular, we prove that the existence of a Nash equilibrium in randomised strategies is undecidable, while the existence of a…
In this note, we study a class of deterministic finite-horizon linear-quadratic difference games with coupled affine inequality constraints involving both state and control variables. We show that the necessary conditions for the existence…
This work proposes a novel distributed approach for computing a Nash equilibrium in convex games with merely monotone and restricted strongly monotone pseudo-gradients. By leveraging the idea of the centralized operator extrapolation method…