Related papers: Equilibrium of Data Markets with Externality
The $\textit{data market design}$ problem is a problem in economic theory to find a set of signaling schemes (statistical experiments) to maximize expected revenue to the information seller, where each experiment reveals some of the…
In this paper I discuss truthful equilibria in common agency models. Specifically, I provide general conditions under which truthful equilibria are plausible, easy to calculate and efficient. These conditions generalize similar results in…
We study linear Fisher markets with satiation. In these markets, sellers have earning limits and buyers have utility limits. Beyond natural applications in economics, these markets arise in the context of maximizing Nash social welfare when…
The existence of a (partial) market equilibrium price is proved in a complete, continuous time finite-agent market setting. The economic agents act as price takers in a fully competitive setting and maximize exponential utility from…
In a multi-unit market, a seller brings multiple units of a good and tries to sell them to a set of buyers that have monetary endowments. While a Walrasian equilibrium does not always exist in this model, natural relaxations of the concept…
According to the fundamental theorems of welfare economics, any competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient. Unfortunately, competitive equilibrium prices only exist under strong assumptions such as perfectly divisible goods and convex…
Equilibrium modeling is common in a variety of fields such as game theory and transportation science. The inputs for these models, however, are often difficult to estimate, while their outputs, i.e., the equilibria they are meant to…
In this chapter, an input-output economic model with multiple interactive economic systems is considered. The model captures the multi-dimensional nature of the economic sectors or industries in each economic system, the interdependencies…
We study an Arrow-Debreu economy with externalities generated by multiplex networks. Market equilibrium prices reflect both the preferences and scarcity of goods, consumers' network centralities arising from goods' externalities, as well as…
We study the power and limitations of posted prices in multi-unit markets, where agents arrive sequentially in an arbitrary order. We prove upper and lower bounds on the largest fraction of the optimal social welfare that can be guaranteed…
Computing market equilibria is an important practical problem for market design, for example in fair division of items. However, computing equilibria requires large amounts of information (typically the valuation of every buyer for every…
Proportional dynamics, originated from peer-to-peer file sharing systems, models a decentralized price-learning process in Fisher markets. Previously, items in the dynamics operate independently of one another, and each is assumed to belong…
We present a methodology for representing probabilistic relationships in a general-equilibrium economic model. Specifically, we define a precise mapping from a Bayesian network with binary nodes to a market price system where consumers and…
Cross-group externalities and network effects in two-sided platform markets shape market structure and competition policy, and are the subject of extensive study. Less understood are the within-group externalities that arise when the…
We study combinatorial auctions where each item is sold separately but simultaneously via a second price auction. We ask whether it is possible to efficiently compute in this game a pure Nash equilibrium with social welfare close to the…
The introduction of aggregator structures has proven effective in bringing fairness to energy resource allocation by negotiating for more resources and economic surplus on behalf of users. This paper extends the fair energy resource…
As large language models increasingly rely on external data sources, compensating data contributors has become a central concern. But how should these payments be devised? We revisit data valuations from a $\textit{market-design…
With the growing use of distributed machine learning techniques, there is a growing need for data markets that allows agents to share data with each other. Nevertheless data has unique features that separates it from other commodities…
As the number of prosumers with distributed energy resources (DERs) grows, the conventional centralized operation scheme may suffer from conflicting interests, privacy concerns, and incentive inadequacy. In this paper, we propose an energy…
We study a dynamic market setting where an intermediary interacts with an unknown large sequence of agents that can be either sellers or buyers: their identities, as well as the sequence length $n$, are decided in an adversarial, online…