Related papers: Ambiguous Contracts
A framework for consensus modelling is introduced using Kleene's three valued logic as a means to express vagueness in agents' beliefs. Explicitly borderline cases are inherent to propositions involving vague concepts where sentences of a…
We study the ability of language models to reason about appropriate information disclosure - a central aspect of the evolving field of agentic privacy. Whereas previous works have focused on evaluating a model's ability to align with human…
We characterize the optimal reward functions (scoring rules) that incentivize an agent to acquire information and report it truthfully to the principal. The optimal scoring rules let the agent make a simple binary bet in single-dimensional…
A fundamental result in mechanism design theory, the so-called revelation principle, asserts that for many questions concerning the existence of mechanisms with a given outcome one can restrict attention to truthful direct…
We consider two risk-averse financial agents who negotiate the price of an illiquid indivisible contingent claim in an incomplete semimartingale market environment. Under the assumption that the agents are exponential utility maximizers…
I study a principal-agent model in which a principal hires an agent to collect information about an unknown continuous state. The agent acquires a signal whose distribution is centered around the state, controlling the signal's precision at…
The quality of rationales is essential in the reasoning capabilities of language models. Rationales not only enhance reasoning performance in complex natural language tasks but also justify model decisions. However, obtaining impeccable…
Models of economic decision makers often include idealized assumptions, such as rationality, perfect foresight, and access to all relevant pieces of information. These assumptions often assure the models' internal validity, but, at the same…
Completeness and transitivity are standard rationality conditions in economics. However, under ambiguity, decision makers sometimes violate these requirements because of the difficulty of forming accurate predictions about ambiguous events.…
We study the problem of a principal who wants to influence an agent's observable action, subject to an ex-post budget. The agent has a private type determining their cost function. This paper endogenizes the value of the resource driving…
Methods for learning optimal policies in autonomous agents often assume that the way the domain is conceptualised---its possible states and actions and their causal structure---is known in advance and does not change during learning. This…
We study a variant of the principal-agent problem in which the principal does not directly observe the agent's effort outcome; rather, she gets a signal about the agent's action according to a variable information structure designed by a…
This article introduces a framework for evaluating statistical decisions under both prior ambiguity and likelihood misspecification. We begin with an ambiguity set - a frequentist model that pairs a possibly misspecified likelihood with…
This paper proposes a model of decision-making under uncertainty in which an agent is constrained in her cognitive ability to consider complex acts. We identify the complexity of an act according to the corresponding partition of state…
In this work we show that the ordering ambiguity on quantization depends on the representation choice. This property is then used to solve unambiguously some particular systems. Finally, we speculate on the consequences for more involved…
This essay discusses the advantages of a probabilistic agent-based approach to questions in theoretical economics, from the nature of economic agents, to the nature of the equilibria supported by their interactions. One idea we propose is…
This paper develops a theory of learning under ambiguity induced by the decision maker's beliefs about the collection of data correlated with the true state of the world. Within our framework, two classical results on Bayesian learning…
We study a simple problem of allocating common-value goods. The designer seeks to allocate the goods to as many unit-demand agents as possible without monetary transfers, while agents, who possess partial private information about the…
We suggest that the analysis of incomplete contracting developed by law and economics researchers can provide a useful framework for understanding the AI alignment problem and help to generate a systematic approach to finding solutions. We…
In the presence of ambiguity on the driving force of market randomness, we consider the dynamic portfolio choice without any predetermined investment horizon. The investment criteria is formulated as a robust forward performance process,…