Related papers: On the Difficulty of Characterizing Network Format…

This paper presents a model of network formation in repeated games where the players adapt their strategies and network ties simultaneously using a simple reinforcement-learning scheme. It is demonstrated that the coevolutionary dynamics of…

As a step towards studying human-agent collectives we conduct an online game with human participants cooperating on a network. The game is presented in the context of achieving group formation through local coordination. The players set…

Network games provide a framework to study strategic decision making processes that are governed by structured interdependencies among agents. However, existing models do not account for environments in which agents simultaneously interact…

We study a sequential-learning model featuring a network of naive agents with Gaussian information structures. Agents apply a heuristic rule to aggregate predecessors' actions. They weigh these actions according the strengths of their…

We study a network formation game where agents receive benefits by forming connections to other agents but also incur both direct and indirect costs from the formed connections. Specifically, once the agents have purchased their…

In various economic environments, people observe other people with whom they strategically interact. We can model such information-sharing relations as an information network, and the strategic interactions as a game on the network. When…

In this paper, we study a network formation game in which agents seek to maximize their influence by allocating constrained resources to choose connections with other agents. In particular, we use Katz centrality to model agents' influence…

Network Creation Games are an important framework for understanding the formation of real-world networks. These games usually assume a set of indistinguishable agents strategically buying edges at a uniform price leading to a network among…

We investigate several variants of a network creation model: a group of agents builds up a network between them while trying to keep the costs of this network small. The cost function consists of two addends, namely (i) a constant amount…

This paper studies $n$-person simultaneous-move games with linear best response function, where individuals interact within a given network structure. This class of games have been used to model various settings, such as, public goods,…

Traditional evolutionary game theory describes how certain strategy spreads throughout the system where individual player imitates the most successful strategy among its neighborhood. Accordingly, player doesn't have own authority to change…

In this paper we study a model of weighted network formation. The bilateral interaction is modeled as a Tullock contest game with the possibility of a draw. We describe stable networks under different concepts of stability. We show that a…

We propose a novel network formation game that explains the emergence of various hierarchical structures in groups where self-interested or utility-maximizing individuals decide to establish or severe relationships of authority or…

Today we rely on networks that are created and maintained by smart devices. For such networks, there is no governing central authority but instead the network structure is shaped by the decisions of selfish intelligent agents. A key…

In this paper, I characterize the network formation process as a static game of incomplete information, where the latent payoff of forming a link between two individuals depends on the structure of the network, as well as private…

Coalition formation concerns strategic collaborations of selfish agents that form coalitions based on their preferences. It is often assumed that coalitions are disjoint and preferences are fully known, which may not hold in practice. In…

Biological networks of interacting agents exhibit similar topological properties for a wide range of scales, from cellular to ecological levels, suggesting the existence of a common evolutionary origin. A general evolutionary mechanism…

Networks are central to many economic and organizational applications, including workplace team formation, social platform recommendations, and classroom friendship development. In these settings, networks are modeled as graphs, with agents…

This paper addresses a class of network games played by dynamic agents using their outputs. Unlike most existing related works, the Nash equilibrium in this work is defined by functions of agent outputs instead of full agent states, which…

A generic property of biological, social and economical networks is their ability to evolve in time, creating and suppressing interactions. We approach this issue within the framework of an adaptive network of agents playing a Prisoner's…