Related papers: Low Sample Complexity Participatory Budgeting
Persuasion studies how a principal can influence agents' decisions via strategic information revelation --- often described as a signaling scheme --- in order to yield the most desirable equilibrium outcome. Recently, there has been a large…
The notion of distortion in social choice problems has been defined to measure the loss in efficiency -- typically measured by the utilitarian social welfare, the sum of utilities of the participating agents -- due to having access only to…
The voter model is a toy model of consensus formation based on nearest-neighbor interactions. A voter sits at each vertex in a hypercubic lattice (of dimension $d$) and is in one of two possible opinion states. The opinion state of each…
The guarantee of an anonymous mechanism is the worst case welfare an agent can secure against unanimously adversarial others. How high can such a guarantee be, and what type of mechanism achieves it? We address the worst case design…
The design of revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions, i.e. multi-item auctions over bundles of goods, is one of the most fundamental problems in computational economics, unsolved even for two bidders and two items for sale. In the…
Prediction markets mobilize financial incentives to forecast binary event outcomes through the aggregation of dispersed beliefs and heterogeneous information. Their growing popularity and demonstrated predictive accuracy in political…
When making a decision as a group, there are two primary paradigms: aggregating preferences (e.g. voting, mechanism design) and aggregating information (e.g. discussion, consulting, forecasting). Almost all formally-studied group…
We introduce a novel stochastic version of the non-reversible, rejection-free Bouncy Particle Sampler (BPS), a Markov process whose sample trajectories are piecewise linear. The algorithm is based on simulating first arrival times in a…
In this work we consider the task of constructing prediction intervals in an inductive batch setting. We present a discriminative learning framework which optimizes the expected error rate under a budget constraint on the interval sizes.…
We study a budget aggregation setting where voters express their preferred allocation of a fixed budget over a set of alternatives, and a mechanism aggregates these preferences into a single output allocation. Motivated by scenarios in…
We study the concept of bribery in the situation where voters are willing to change their votes as we ask them, but where their prices depend on the nature of the change we request. Our model is an extension of the one of Faliszewski et al.…
We introduce a two-stage probabilistic framework for statistical downscaling using unpaired data. Statistical downscaling seeks a probabilistic map to transform low-resolution data from a biased coarse-grained numerical scheme to…
This paper considers a class of constrained stochastic composite optimization problems whose objective function is given by the summation of a differentiable (possibly nonconvex) component, together with a certain non-differentiable (but…
This paper considers extensions of minimum-disparity estimators to the problem of estimating parameters in a regression model that is conditionally specified; that is where a parametric model describes the distribution of a response $y$…
Classical extragradient schemes and their stochastic counterpart represent a cornerstone for resolving monotone variational inequality problems. Yet, such schemes have a per-iteration complexity of two projections onto a convex set and…
We study how electoral rules shape polarization dynamics when voters and candidates both adapt to repeated election outcomes. We introduce two geometric primitives for comparing rules under this feedback: the \emph{winner radius} $R_t =…
Recent advancements in pre-trained language models (PLMs) have demonstrated that these models possess some degree of syntactic awareness. To leverage this knowledge, we propose a novel chart-based method for extracting parse trees from…
In populations with community structure, the formation of consensus requires both alignment within and diffusion of beliefs across groups, processes that evolve on distinct time scales. How do modularity, asymmetry, and polarization shape…
Most work on manipulation assumes that all preferences are known to the manipulators. However, in many settings elections are open and sequential, and manipulators may know the already cast votes but may not know the future votes. We…
Here we present \texttt{electoral\_sim}, an open-source Python framework for simulating and comparing electoral systems across diverse voter preference distributions. The framework represents voters and candidates as points in a…