Related papers: Transient Attack against the KLJN Secure Key Excha…
If an eavesdropper Eve is equipped with quantum computers, she can easily break the public key exchange protocols used today. In this paper we will discuss the post-quantum Diffie-Hellman key exchange and private key exchange protocols.
In a two-way deterministic quantum key distribution (DQKD) protocol, Bob randomly prepares qubits in one of four states and sends them to Alice. To encode a bit, Alice performs an operation on each received qubit and returns it to Bob. Bob…
We present the wavelength attack on a practical continuous-variable quantum-key-distribution system with a heterodyne protocol, in which the transmittance of beam splitters at Bob's station is wavelength-dependent. Our strategy is proposed…
We propose the problem of wiretapped commitment, where two parties, say committer Alice and receiver Bob, engage in a commitment protocol using a noisy channel as a resource, in the presence of an eavesdropper, say Eve. Noisy versions of…
Quantum illumination permits Alice and Bob to communicate at 50 Mbit/s over 50 km of low-loss fiber with error probability less than 10^(-6) while the optimum passive eavesdropper's error probability must exceed 0.28.
Covert wireless communication can prevent an adversary from knowing the existence of user's transmission, thus provide stronger security protection. In AWGN channels, a square root law was obtained and the result shows that Alice can…
We obtain estimates for Eve's forgery probability, namely the probability that she is able to forge a message which Alice or Bob mistakenly accept over a noisy Quantum channel for generating a shared Quantum secret key. This probability is…
The security of quantum cryptography is guaranteed by the no-cloning theorem, which implies that an eavesdropper copying transmitted qubits in unknown states causes their disturbance. Nevertheless, in real cryptographic systems some level…
Twin-field quantum key distribution (TF-QKD) and its variants can overcome the fundamental rate-distance limit of QKD which has been demonstrated in the laboratory and field while their physical implementations with side channels remains to…
We consider a broadcast channel, in which a multi-antenna transmitter (Alice) sends $K$ confidential information signals to $K$ legitimate users (Bobs) in the presence of $L$ eavesdroppers (Eves). Alice uses MIMO precoding to generate the…
Recent works have considered the ability of transmitter Alice to communicate reliably to receiver Bob without being detected by warden Willie. These works generally assume a standard discrete-time model. But the assumption of a…
Quantum secure direct communication is one of the important mode of quantum communication, which sends secret information through a quantum channel directly without setting up a prior key. Over the past decade, numerous protocols have been…
A transmitter Alice may wish to reliably transmit a message to a receiver Bob over a binary symmetric channel (BSC), while simultaneously ensuring that her transmission is deniable from an eavesdropper Willie. That is, if Willie listening…
We investigate the post-quantum security of the encrypted key exchange(EKE) protocols based on some basic physical parameters of ion-trap quantum computer, and show that the EKE protocol with a 40-bit password will be secure against a…
In this article, we experimentally demonstrate an eavesdropper's (Eve's) information gain by exploiting the breakdown flash generated by the single photon avalanche detector (SPAD) used in coherent one-way quantum key distribution (COW-QKD)…
We point out that arguments for the security of Kish's noise-based cryptographic protocol have relied on an unphysical no-wave limit, which if taken seriously would prevent any correlation from developing between the users. We introduce a…
We propose a double blinding-attack on entangled-based quantum key distribution protocols. The principle of the attack is the same as in existing blinding attack except that instead of blinding the detectors on one side only, Eve is…
Security of an ideal system for quantum key distribution can be formally proved. However, technological imperfections of real systems can be misused by an eavesdropper to get information about the key without causing a detectable change in…
We discuss the speed-error-heat triangle and related problems with rapidly increasing energy dissipation and error rate during miniaturization. These and the independently growing need of unconditional data security have provoked…
In quantum weak oblivious transfer, Alice sends Bob two bits and Bob can learn one of the bits at his choice. It was found that the security of such a protocol is bounded by $2P_{Alice}^{\ast }+P_{Bob}^{\ast }\geq 2$, where $P_{Alice}^{\ast…