Related papers: Almost-Nash Sequential Bargaining
We analyze the stability of a nonlinear dynamical model describing the noncooperative strategic interactions among the agents of a finite collection of populations. Each agent selects one strategy at a time and revises it repeatedly…
This paper investigates the equilibrium convergence properties of a proposed algorithm for potential games with continuous strategy spaces in the presence of feedback delays, a main challenge in multi-agent systems that compromises the…
Inspired by Internet ad auction applications, we study the problem of allocating a single item via an auction when bidders place very different values on the item. We formulate this as the problem of prior-free auction and focus on…
We develop a framework that leverages the smoothed complexity analysis by Spielman and Teng to circumvent paradoxes and impossibility theorems in social choice, motivated by modern applications of social choice powered by AI and ML. For…
Computational tractability and social welfare (aka. efficiency) of equilibria are two fundamental but in general orthogonal considerations in algorithmic game theory. Nevertheless, we show that when (approximate) full efficiency can be…
Nash equilibrium is one of the most influential solution concepts in game theory. With the development of computer science and artificial intelligence, there is an increasing demand on Nash equilibrium computation, especially for Internet…
We study the problem of allocating indivisible goods among agents in a fair and economically efficient manner. In this context, the Nash social welfare-defined as the geometric mean of agents' valuations for their assigned bundles-stands as…
This paper considers incentives to provide goods that are partially shareable along social links. We introduce a model in which each individual in a social network not only decides how much of a shareable good to provide, but also decides…
Bargaining networks model social or economic situations in which agents seek to form the most lucrative partnership with another agent from among several alternatives. There has been a flurry of recent research studying Nash bargaining…
We formulate offloading of computational tasks from a dynamic group of mobile agents (e.g., cars) as decentralized decision making among autonomous agents. We design an interaction mechanism that incentivizes such agents to align private…
This paper tackles the problem of how two selfish users jointly determine the operating point in the achievable rate region of a two-user Gaussian interference channel through bargaining. In previous work, incentive conditions for two users…
Meritocratic systems, from admissions to hiring, aim to impartially reward skill and effort. Yet persistent disparities across race, gender, and class challenge this ideal. Some attribute these gaps to structural inequality; others to…
The paper addresses a problem of sequential bilateral bargaining with incomplete information. We proposed a decision model that helps agents to successfully bargain by performing indirect negotiation and learning the opponent's model.…
The standard risk minimization paradigm of machine learning is brittle when operating in environments whose test distributions are different from the training distribution due to spurious correlations. Training on data from many…
We introduce a new framework to study the group dynamics and game-theoretic considerations when voters in a committee are allowed to trade votes. This model represents a significant step forward by considering vote-for-vote trades in a…
We develop a framework for the analysis of large-scale Ad-auctions where adverts are assigned over a continuum of search types. For this pay-per-click market, we provide an efficient mechanism that maximizes social welfare. In particular,…
Network slicing to enable resource sharing among multiple tenants --network operators and/or services-- is considered a key functionality for next generation mobile networks. This paper provides an analysis of a well-known model for…
Optimal mechanism design enjoys a beautiful and well-developed theory, and also a number of killer applications. Rules of thumb produced by the field influence everything from how governments sell wireless spectrum licenses to how the major…
A growing body of literature in networked systems research relies on game theory and mechanism design to model and address the potential lack of cooperation between self-interested users. Most game-theoretic models applied to system…
It is well-known that for several natural decision problems no budget balanced Groves mechanisms exist. This has motivated recent research on designing variants of feasible Groves mechanisms (termed as `redistribution of VCG…