Related papers: Dynamic Programming for Pure-Strategy Subgame Perf…

Pontryagin type maximum principle and Bellman's dynamic programming principle serve as two of the most important tools in solving optimal control problems. There is a huge literature on the study of relationship between them. The main…

We study rational agents with different perception capabilities in strategic games. We focus on a class of one-shot limited-perception games. These games extend simultaneous-move normal-form games by presenting each player with an…

We study a class of zero-sum stochastic games between a stopper and a singular-controller, previously considered in [Bovo and De Angelis (2025)]. The underlying singularly-controlled dynamics takes values in…

Although recent work in AI has made great progress in solving large, zero-sum, extensive-form games, the underlying assumption in most past work is that the parameters of the game itself are known to the agents. This paper deals with the…

Simple adaptive procedures that converge to correlated equilibria are known to exist for normal form games (Hart and Mas-Colell 2000), but no such analogue exists for extensive-form games. Leveraging inspiration from Zinkevich et al.…

Zero-sum games are a fundamental setting for adversarial training and decision-making in multi-agent learning (MAL). Existing methods often ensure convergence to (approximate) Nash equilibria by introducing a form of regularization. Yet,…

The complexity of computing equilibrium refinements has been at the forefront of algorithmic game theory research, but it has remained open in the seminal class of potential games; we close this fundamental gap in this paper. We first show…

We consider challenging dynamic programming models where the associated Bellman equation, and the value and policy iteration algorithms commonly exhibit complex and even pathological behavior. Our analysis is based on the new notion of…

Estimating discrete games of complete information is often computationally difficult due to partial identification and the absence of closed-form moment characterizations. This paper proposes computationally tractable approaches to…

This paper studies a mean field game inspired by crowd motion in which agents evolve in a compact domain and want to reach its boundary minimizing the sum of their travel time and a given boundary cost. Interactions between agents occur…

We propose a general definition of perfect equilibrium which is applicable to a wide class of games. A key feature is the concept of completely mixed nets of strategies, based on a more detailed notion of carrier of a strategy. Under…

In this paper, we introduce a novel equilibrium concept, called the equilibrium cycle, which seeks to capture the outcome of oscillatory game dynamics. Unlike the (pure) Nash equilibrium, which defines a fixed point of mutual best…

We study a class of stochastic dynamic games that exhibit strategic complementarities between players; formally, in the games we consider, the payoff of a player has increasing differences between her own state and the empirical…

Dynamic zero-sum games are an important class of problems with applications ranging from evasion-pursuit and heads-up poker to certain adversarial versions of control problems such as multi-armed bandit and multiclass queuing problems.…

A class of nonzero-sum stochastic dynamic games with imperfect information structure is investigated. The game involves an arbitrary number of players, modeled as homogeneous Markov decision processes, aiming to find a sequential Nash…

In this paper, we investigate a class of nonzero-sum dynamic stochastic games, where players have linear dynamics and quadratic cost functions. The players are coupled in both dynamics and cost through a linear regression (weighted average)…

The semi-random graph process is a single player game in which the player is initially presented an empty graph on $n$ vertices. In each round, a vertex $u$ is presented to the player independently and uniformly at random. The player then…

This paper extends Berge's maximum theorem for possibly noncompact action sets and unbounded cost functions to minimax problems and studies applications of these extensions to two-player zero-sum games with possibly noncompact action sets…

We apply Blackwell optimality to repeated games. An equilibrium whose strategy profile is sequentially rational for all high enough discount factors simultaneously is a Blackwell (subgame-perfect, perfect public, etc.) equilibrium. The bite…

In this paper, we consider the infinite-horizon reach-avoid zero-sum game problem, where the goal is to find a set in the state space, referred to as the reach-avoid set, such that the system starting at a state therein could be controlled…