Related papers: DeTorrent: An Adversarial Padding-only Traffic Ana…
Recent work in traffic analysis has shown that traffic patterns leaked through side channels can be used to recover important semantic information. For instance, attackers can find out which website, or which page on a website, a user is…
Tor onion services rely on long-lived introduction circuits to support anonymous rendezvous between clients and services. Although Tor incorporates defenses against traffic analysis, the introduction protocol retains deterministic routing…
Website fingerprinting (WF) is a well-know threat to users' web privacy. New internet standards, such as QUIC, include padding to support defenses against WF. Previous work only analyzes the effectiveness of defenses when users are behind a…
Website Fingerprinting (WF) attacks exploit patterns in encrypted traffic to infer the websites visited by users, posing a serious threat to anonymous communication systems. Although recent WF techniques achieve over 90% accuracy in…
The decentralized nature of federated learning makes detecting and defending against adversarial attacks a challenging task. This paper focuses on backdoor attacks in the federated learning setting, where the goal of the adversary is to…
Tor provides low-latency anonymous and uncensored network access against a local or network adversary. Due to the design choice to minimize traffic overhead (and increase the pool of potential users) Tor allows some information about the…
Flow correlation is the core technique used in a multitude of deanonymization attacks on Tor. Despite the importance of flow correlation attacks on Tor, existing flow correlation techniques are considered to be ineffective and unreliable in…
Tor is a low-latency anonymous communication network that protects user privacy by encrypting website traffic. However, recent website fingerprinting (WF) attacks have shown that encrypted traffic can still leak users' visited websites by…
Previous attacks that link the sender and receiver of traffic in the Tor network ("correlation attacks") have generally relied on analyzing traffic from TCP connections. The TCP connections of a typical client application, however, are…
Tor recently integrated a circuit padding framework for creating padding machines: defenses that work by defining state machines that inject dummy traffic to protect against traffic analysis attacks like Website Fingerprinting (WF) attacks.…
We introduce a new class of lower overhead tunnel that is resistant to traffic analysis. The tunnel opportunistically reduces the number of dummy packets transmitted during busy times when many flows are simultaneously active while…
Website fingerprinting (WF) attacks identify the websites visited over anonymized connections by analyzing patterns in network traffic flows, such as packet sizes, directions, or interval times using a machine learning classifier. Previous…
Website fingerprinting (WF) attacks, usually conducted with the help of a machine learning-based classifier, enable a network eavesdropper to pinpoint which web page a user is accessing through the inspection of traffic patterns. These…
Website fingerprinting is an attack that uses size and timing characteristics of encrypted downloads to identify targeted websites. Since this can defeat the privacy goals of anonymity networks such as Tor, many algorithms to defend against…
Website fingerprinting attacks enable an adversary to infer which website a victim is visiting, even if the victim uses an encrypting proxy, such as Tor. Previous work has shown that all proposed defenses against website fingerprinting…
Website Fingerprinting (WF) attacks can effectively identify the websites visited by Tor clients via analyzing encrypted traffic patterns. Existing attacks focus on identifying different websites, but their accuracy dramatically decreases…
Website fingerprinting (WF) is a dangerous attack on web privacy because it enables an adversary to predict the website a user is visiting, despite the use of encryption, VPNs, or anonymizing networks such as Tor. Previous WF work almost…
Modern low-latency anonymity systems, no matter whether constructed as an overlay or implemented at the network layer, offer limited security guarantees against traffic analysis. On the other hand, high-latency anonymity systems offer…
A passive local eavesdropper can leverage Website Fingerprinting (WF) to deanonymize the web browsing activity of Tor users. The value of timing information to WF has often been discounted in recent works due to the volatility of low-level…
Attacks on Internet routing are typically viewed through the lens of availability and confidentiality, assuming an adversary that either discards traffic or performs eavesdropping. Yet, a strategic adversary can use routing attacks to…