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Fair division is a fundamental problem in various multi-agent settings, where the goal is to divide a set of resources among agents in a fair manner. We study the case where m indivisible items need to be divided among n agents with…
We consider Max-min Share (MmS) allocations of items both in the case where items are goods (positive utility) and when they are chores (negative utility). We show that fair allocations of goods and chores have some fundamental connections…
We study the allocation of shared resources over multiple rounds among competing agents, via the dynamic max-min fair (DMMF) mechanism: the good in each round is allocated to the requesting agent with the least number of allocations…
We consider the problem of guaranteeing maximin-share (MMS) when allocating a set of indivisible items to a set of agents with fractionally subadditive (XOS) valuations. For XOS valuations, it has been previously shown that for some…
We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible goods to agents with submodular valuation functions, where agents may have either equal entitlements or arbitrary (possibly unequal) entitlements. We focus on share-based fairness…
We consider the problem of approximate maximin share (MMS) allocation of indivisible items among three agents with additive valuation functions. For goods, we show that an $\frac{11}{12}$ - MMS allocation always exists, improving over the…
We study the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items to a set of agents with additive valuations. Recently, Feige et al. (WINE'21) proved that a maximin share (MMS) allocation exists for all instances with $n$ agents and no…
We consider the task of assigning indivisible goods to a set of agents in a fair manner. Our notion of fairness is Nash social welfare, i.e., the goal is to maximize the geometric mean of the utilities of the agents. Each good comes in…
We study the fundamental problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods among $n$ agents with additive valuations using the desirable fairness notion of maximin share (MMS). MMS is the most popular share-based notion, in which an…
We study a fair division problem with indivisible items, namely the computation of maximin share allocations. Given a set of $n$ players, the maximin share of a single player is the best she can guarantee to herself, if she would partition…
The maximin share ($\textsf{MMS}$) is the most prominent share-based fairness notion in the fair allocation of indivisible goods. Recent years have seen significant efforts to improve the approximation guarantees for $\textsf{MMS}$ for…
We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible goods to $n$ agents, with no transfers. When agents have equal entitlements, the well established notion of the maximin share (MMS) serves as an attractive fairness criterion, where…
We consider the fair division of indivisible items using the maximin shares measure. Recent work on the topic has focused on extending results beyond the class of additive valuation functions. In this spirit, we study the case where the…
An indivisible object may be sold to one of $n$ agents who know their valuations of the object. The seller would like to use a revenue-maximizing mechanism but her knowledge of the valuations' distribution is scarce: she knows only the…
We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible items to agents that have arbitrary entitlements to the items. Every agent $i$ has a valuation function $v_i$ and an entitlement $b_i$, where entitlements sum up to~1. Which…
The fair allocation of mixed goods, consisting of both divisible and indivisible goods, has been a prominent topic of study in economics and computer science. We define an allocation as fair if its utility vector minimizes a symmetric…
One of the important yet insufficiently studied subjects in fair allocation is the externality effect among agents. For a resource allocation problem, externalities imply that a bundle allocated to an agent may affect the utilities of other…
We study the fair division of indivisible items among $n$ agents with heterogeneous additive valuations, subject to lower and upper quotas on the number of items allocated to each agent. Such constraints are crucial in various applications,…
We study fair allocation of indivisible public goods subject to cardinality (budget) constraints. In this model, we have n agents and m available public goods, and we want to select $k \leq m$ goods in a fair and efficient manner. We first…
We consider item allocation to individual agents who have additive valuations, in settings in which there are protected groups, and the allocation needs to give each protected group its "fair" share of the total welfare. Informally, within…