Related papers: EC-CFI: Control-Flow Integrity via Code Encryption…
Control-Flow Attestation (CFA) is a security service that allows an entity (verifier) to verify the integrity of code execution on a remote computer system (prover). Existing CFA schemes suffer from impractical assumptions, such as…
Memory corruption is an important class of vulnerability that can be leveraged to craft control flow hijacking attacks. Control Flow Integrity (CFI) provides protection against such attacks. Application of type-based CFI policies requires…
Verifying integrity of software execution in low-end micro-controller units (MCUs) is a well-known open problem. The central challenge is how to securely detect software exploits with minimal overhead, since these MCUs are designed for low…
Rising device use and third-party IP integration in semiconductors raise security concerns. Unauthorized access, fault injection, and privacy invasion are potential threats from untrusted actors. Different security techniques have been…
Fault injection attacks (FIA) pose significant security threats to embedded systems as they exploit weaknesses across multiple layers, including system software, instruction set architecture (ISA), microarchitecture, and physical hardware.…
Fault injection attacks represent an effective threat to embedded systems. Recently, Laurent et al. have reported that fault injection attacks can leverage faults inside the microarchitecture. However, state-of-the-art counter-measures,…
Despite its ever-increasing impact, security is not considered as a design objective in commercial electronic design automation (EDA) tools. This results in vulnerabilities being overlooked during the software-hardware design process.…
This paper presents an in-kernel, hardware-based control-flow integrity (CFI) protection, called PAL, that utilizes ARM's Pointer Authentication (PA). It provides three important benefits over commercial, state-of-the-art PA-based CFIs like…
The prevalence of memory corruption bugs in the past decades resulted in numerous defenses, such as stack canaries, control flow integrity (CFI), and memory safe languages. These defenses can prevent entire classes of vulnerabilities, and…
Software control flow integrity (CFI) solutions have been applied to the Linux kernel for memory protection. Due to performance costs, deployed software CFI solutions are coarse grained. In this work, we demonstrate a precise…
Microcontroller-based embedded systems are vital in daily life, but are especially vulnerable to control-flow hijacking attacks due to hardware and software constraints. Control-Flow Attestation (CFA) aims to precisely attest the execution…
Embedded software is developed under the assumption that hardware execution is always correct. Fault attacks break and exploit that assumption. Through the careful introduction of targeted faults, an adversary modifies the control-flow or…
Attacks targeting software on embedded systems are becoming increasingly prevalent. Remote attestation is a mechanism that allows establishing trust in embedded devices. However, existing attestation schemes are either static and cannot…
Information Flow Control (IFC) is a collection of techniques for ensuring a no-write-down no-read-up style security policy known as noninterference. Traditional methods for both static and dynamic IFC suffer from untenable numbers of false…
Hardware intellectual property (IP) piracy is an emerging threat to the global supply chain. Correspondingly, various countermeasures aim to protect hardware IPs, such as logic locking, camouflaging, and split manufacturing. However, these…
Fault attacks are active, physical attacks that an adversary can leverage to alter the control-flow of embedded devices to gain access to sensitive information or bypass protection mechanisms. Due to the severity of these attacks,…
Smart contracts power decentralized financial (DeFi) services but are vulnerable to security exploits that can lead to significant financial losses. Existing security measures often fail to adequately protect these contracts due to the…
This work presents the first design, integration, and evaluation of the standard RISC-V extensions for Control-Flow Integrity (CFI). The Zicfiss and Zicfilp extensions aim at protecting the execution of a vulnerable program from…
Fault attacks against embedded circuits enabled to define many new attack paths against secure circuits. Every attack path relies on a specific fault model which defines the type of faults that the attacker can perform. On embedded…
Control Flow Attestation (CFA) offers a means to detect control flow hijacking attacks on remote devices, enabling verification of their runtime trustworthiness. CFA generates a trace (CFLog) containing the destination of all branching…