Related papers: Certification Design for a Competitive Market
With the increasing complexity of software permeating critical domains such as autonomous driving, new challenges are emerging in the ways the engineering of these systems needs to be rethought. Autonomous driving is expected to continue…
Interference between treated and untreated units is a source of bias in marketplace experiments. In this paper, we specifically consider pricing interventions, in which a platform seeks to adjust base pricing levels at the marketplace level…
Matching markets are of particular interest in computer science and economics literature as they are often used to model real-world phenomena where we aim to equitably distribute a limited amount of resources to multiple agents and…
Product diversity is one of the prominent factors for customers' satisfaction, while from the firms' perspective, the additional engineering costs required for product diversity should not exceed the acquired profits from the increase in…
Prediction markets are used in real life to predict outcomes of interest such as presidential elections. This paper presents a mathematical theory of artificial prediction markets for supervised learning of conditional probability…
Advances in algorithms and hardware have enabled computers to design new materials atom-by-atom. However, in order for these computer-generated materials to truly address problems of societal importance, such as clean energy generation, it…
Classification algorithms aim to predict an unknown label (e.g., a quality class) for a new instance (e.g., a product). Therefore, training samples (instances and labels) are used to deduct classification hypotheses. Often, it is relatively…
Safety-critical control tasks with high levels of uncertainty are becoming increasingly common. Typically, techniques that guarantee safety during learning and control utilize constraint-based safety certificates, which can be leveraged to…
We study the competition for partners in two-sided matching markets with heterogeneous agent preferences, with a focus on how the equilibrium outcomes depend on the connectivity in the market. We model random partially connected markets,…
How should a buyer design procurement mechanisms when suppliers' costs are unknown, and the buyer does not have a prior belief? We demonstrate that simple mechanisms - that share a constant fraction of the buyer utility with the seller -…
We study the regulation of a monopolistic firm using a robust-design approach. We solve for the policy that minimizes the regulator's worst-case regret, where the regret is the difference between his complete-information payoff minus his…
The test pyramid is a conceptual model that describes how quality checks can be organized to ensure coverage of all components of a system, at all scales. Originally conceived to help aerospace engineers plan tests to determine how material…
As consumer flexibility becomes expected, it is important that the market mechanisms which attain that flexibility are perceived as fair. We set out fairness issues in energy markets today, and propose a market design to address them.…
Fair representation learning provides an effective way of enforcing fairness constraints without compromising utility for downstream users. A desirable family of such fairness constraints, each requiring similar treatment for similar…
Federated Learning (FL) is a distributed machine learning scheme that enables clients to train a shared global model without exchanging local data. The presence of label noise can severely degrade the FL performance, and some existing…
We consider a seller who offers services to a buyer with multi-unit demand. Prior to the realization of demand, the buyer receives a noisy signal of their future demand, and the seller can design contracts based on the reported value of…
We discuss the pricing methodology for Bonus Certificates and Barrier Reverse-Convertible Structured Products. Pricing for a European barrier condition is straightforward for products of both types and depends on an efficient interpolation…
We use valid inequalities (cuts) of the binary integer program for winner determination in a combinatorial auction (CA) as "artificial items" that can be interpreted intuitively and priced to generate Artificial Walrasian Equilibria. We…
We consider a financial market in which traders potentially face restrictions in trading some of the available securities. Traders are heterogeneous with respect to their beliefs and risk profiles, and the market is assumed thin: traders…
We study a signaling game between two firms competing to have their product chosen by a principal. The products have qualities drawn i.i.d. from a common prior. The principal aims to choose the better product, but the quality of a product…