Related papers: A Characterization of Complexity in Public Goods G…
Recently Bramoulle and Kranton presented a model for the provision of public goods over a network and showed the existence of a class of Nash equilibria called specialized equilibria wherein some agents exert maximum effort while other…
We consider any network environment in which the "best shot game" is played. This is the case where the possible actions are only two for every node (0 and 1), and the best response for a node is 1 if and only if all her neighbors play 0. A…
Productive societies feature high levels of cooperation and strong connections between individuals. Public Goods Games (PGGs) are frequently used to study the development of social connections and cooperative behavior in model societies. In…
The public goods game is a broadly used paradigm for studying the evolution of cooperation in structured populations. According to the basic assumption, the interaction graph determines the connections of a player where the focal actor…
Many models from a variety of areas involve the computation of an equilibrium or fixed point of some kind. Examples include Nash equilibria in games; market equilibria; computing optimal strategies and the values of competitive games…
To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…
Game theory is widely used as a behavioral model for strategic interactions in biology and social science. It is common practice to assume that players quickly converge to an equilibrium, e.g. a Nash equilibrium. This can be studied in…
In this Letter we present a new perspective for the study of the Public Goods games on complex networks. The idea of our approach is to consider a realistic structure for the groups in which Public goods games are played. Instead of…
We describe an algorithm for computing best response strategies in a class of two-player infinite games of incomplete information, defined by payoffs piecewise linear in agents' types and actions, conditional on linear comparisons of…
We study the complexity of problems related to subgame-perfect equilibria (SPEs) in infinite duration non zero-sum multiplayer games played on finite graphs with parity objectives. We present new complexity results that close gaps in the…
We investigate the spatial Public Goods Game in the presence of fitness-driven and conformity-driven agents. This framework usually considers only the former type of agents, i.e., agents that tend to imitate the strategy of their fittest…
Noncooperative game theory provides a normative framework for analyzing strategic interactions. However, for the toolbox to be operational, the solutions it defines will have to be computed. In this paper, we provide a single reduction that…
The evolution of cooperation is a central enigma in evolutionary game theory. Traditionally, the combination of pairwise networks and repeated Public Goods Games with a single state fails to adequately describe realistic group interaction…
Covering and packing problems can be modeled as games to encapsulate interesting social and engineering settings. These games have a high Price of Anarchy in their natural formulation. However, existing research applicable to specific…
Public Goods Games represent one of the most useful tools to study group interactions between individuals. However, even if they could provide an explanation for the emergence and stability of cooperation in modern societies, they are not…
One of the natural objectives of the field of the social networks is to predict agents' behaviour. To better understand the spread of various products through a social network arXiv:1105.2434 introduced a threshold model, in which the nodes…
In order to coordinate players in a game must first identify a target pattern of behaviour. In this paper we investigate the difficulty of identifying prominent outcomes in two kinds of binary action coordination problems in social…
We consider the cooperative elements that arise in the design of public goods, such as transportation policies and infrastructure. These involve a variety of stakeholders: governments, businesses, advocates, and users. Their eventual…
The proper equilibrium, introduced by Myerson (1978), is a classic refinement of the Nash equilibrium that has been referred to as the "mother of all refinements." For normal-form games, computing a proper equilibrium is known to be…
We consider the interaction among agents engaging in a driving task and we model it as general-sum game. This class of games exhibits a plurality of different equilibria posing the issue of equilibrium selection. While selecting the most…